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Jeremy Ward
This dissertation comprises three essays in experimental economics. The first inves-
tigates the extent of strategic behaviour in jury voting models. Existing experimental
evidence in jury voting models shows subjects largely act in accordance with theo-
retical predictions, implying that they have the insight to condition their votes upon
their own pivotality. The experiment presented here tests the extent of these abilities,
finding that a large portion of subjects behave consistently with such insight in the
face of several variations on the basic jury voting game, but largely fail to do so in
another, perhaps due to the difficulty of extracting informational implications from
counterintuitive strategies.
The second investigates the extent to which hypothetical thinking - the ability
to condition upon and extract information from hypothetical events - persists across
different strategic environments. Two games of considerable interest in the experimental
literature - jury voting games and common value auctions - each contain the feature that
a sophisticated player can simplify the problem by conditioning upon a hypothetical
event - pivotality and winning the auction, respectively - and extract from it information
about the state of the world that might affect their own behaviour. This common
element suggests that the capability that leads to sophisticated play in one should lead
to the same in the other. This paper tests this connection through a within-subject
experiment in which subjects each play both games. Little evidence is found that play
in one relates to play in the other in any meaningful way.
Finally, the third, co-authored with Evan Friedman, investigates the nature of errors
relative to Nash equilibrium play in a family of two-by-two games. Using data on one-
shot games, we study the mapping from the distribution of player j’s actions to the
distribution of player i’s beliefs (over player j’s actions) and the mapping from player
i’s payoffs (given beliefs) to the distribution over player i’s actions. In our laboratory
experiment, subjects play a set of fully mixed 2× 2 games without feedback and state
their beliefs about which actions they expect their opponents to play. We find that (i)
belief distributions tend to shift in the same direction as changes in opponents’ actions,
(ii) beliefs are systematically biased–“conservative” for one player role and “extreme”
for the other, (iii) rates of best response vary systematically across games, and (iv)
systematic failures to maximize expected payoffs (given beliefs) are well explained by
risk aversion. To better understand the belief formation process, we collect subject-
level measures of strategic sophistication based on dominance solvable games. We find
that (v) the player role itself has a strong effect on sophistication, (vi) sophistication
measured in dominance solvable games strongly predicts behavior in fully mixed games,
and (vii) belief elicitation significantly effects actions in a direction consistent with
increasing sophistication.
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Rarely is the agreement of experimental evidence and theory as startling as that of
the jury voting literature. The underlying model, as described by Austen-Smith and
Banks (1996) and Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998), features equilibria in which a ra-
tional juror maximizes the likelihood of a correct verdict by voting in contrast with
her own private information. The juror is led to this behaviour by the recognition that
she should not vote for the state that is most likely given her private information, but
rather for the state that is most likely given her private information and the event that
her vote is pivotal. Optimal behaviour thus relies on subjects having this insight, form-
ing reasonable beliefs about others’ strategies, and from these beliefs making correct
inferences about the likelihood of each state under the assumption of pivotality - a
process that Palfrey (2016) refers to as pivotal calculus. It is reasonable to expect that
few will have such insights and capabilities.
And yet, an experimental literature led by Guarnaschelli, McKelvey, and Palfrey
(2000) and Goeree and Yariv (2011) finds behaviour that is entirely consistent with
these predictions: subjects vote against their own private information under exactly
the conditions theory predicts, and in numbers that, in the aggregate, are not far from
equilibrium predictions - a startling result. These papers, along with subsequent others
discussed further in the following section, focus primarily on the impact of the jury’s
mechanisms - including communication and group formation - upon aggregate outcomes
and juries’ overall efficiency, with the individual only treated briefly. And yet the truly
surprising aspect of these results is the individual’s apparent ability to solve the game
despite the complexity of the thought process that theory postulates. Given this, and
the potential implications of this ability in other contexts, further investigation of the
individual’s understanding of pivotality and its implications is warranted.
More recently, Esponda and Vespa (2014) take a step in this direction, focusing
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on the individual and asking, in particular, whether it is the hypothetical nature of
pivotality that makes the problem difficult. Their experiment, utilizing a related game,
finds much higher rates of nonstrategic behaviour when pivotality is hypothetical than
when it is directly observed, suggesting that this is the case. Interestingly, however,
they also find much higher rates of nonstrategic behaviour when pivotality is hypothet-
ical than in previous jury voting experiments where this is also the case, including both
Guarnaschelli, McKelvey, and Palfrey (2000) and Goeree and Yariv (2011). Because
the game they employ differs in several important ways from those used in other stud-
ies, including changes to the information structure, the use of computer players, and
complicated computer-player strategies that may confuse subjects, it is not clear what
exactly drives this divergence.
The experiment presented in this paper thus follows a similar path of inquiry, with
a focus on individual behaviour, while retaining the structure of the Guarnaschelli
et al. (2000) game (henceforth GMP), in order to present a clearer image of subjects’
capabilities in these games. In a within-subject design, subjects play five variants of
the GMP game. The first two follow the standard GMP procedure with majority
and unanimity voting, respectively. The remaining three are new variations in which
individual subjects are grouped with computer players with known strategies, thus
removing issues of belief formation and social preferences.
These three new variations allow for three contributions. In the first, in which
computer players vote fully informatively, strategic and non-strategic behaviour are
clearly separated, allowing for better identification of subjects with strategic capabilities
than the standard GMP game, in which certain behaviours, such as fully informative
voting, can result from strategic or naive thought.
The second is similar but requires subjects to choose between receiving an informa-
tive private signal and the ability to select their own vote. Optimal voting behaviour
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is unchanged and can be achieved by the second option, but this requires subjects to
overcome the intuitive notion that giving up private information is costly. A prefer-
ence for this option suggests that subjects’ strategic understanding of the game extends
beyond voting decisions.
Finally, the third follows the first but inverts the strategies played by computer
players - that is, they vote against their private information, behaviour that is itself
fully informative - such that pivotality now holds the opposite informational content
and demands the opposite response. While this computer behaviour is unintuitive, it is
mathematically identical to the first computer game, providing a minimal test of how
subjects’ ability to extract information from others’ behaviour is dependent on that
behaviour. There is strong evidence that it makes a substantial difference, suggesting
subjects may be prone to failures to extract even mathematically simple information
from pivotality, and not just failure to condition upon pivotality in the first place, which
may go some way to explaining the higher rates of nonstrategic behaviour in Esponda
and Vespa (2014), where computer player behaviour is similarly unusual.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 1.2 outlines the standard jury voting
game, its predictions, and existing experimental results in this and related games.
Section 1.3 describes the experimental design, with results discussed in Section 1.4.
Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 A Model of Jury Voting
The canonical model of jury voting is due to Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998), which
builds upon that of Austen-Smith and Banks (1996). A jury of n voters must determine
whether to convict or acquit a passive defendant. The defendant is guilty with probabil-
ity ρ ∈ (0, 1) and innocent otherwise. While this state of the world is unobserved, each
juror receives a private, noisy, conditionally independent signal, again either innocent
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or guilty, which matches the true state with probability p ∈ (1
2
, 1). These signals rep-
resent each juror’s independent, but potentially flawed, interpretation of the evidence
presented to them. Each juror then votes either to convict or acquit. The jury’s verdict
is to convict if at least r jurors vote to convict, and to acquit otherwise. The conviction
threshold, r, ranges from rM to n where rM = dn
2
e represents majority voting and
r = n represents conviction unanimity. Jurors’ utility is normalized to 0 in the event
of correct verdicts, −q in the event of a wrongful conviction, and −(1− q) in the event
of a wrongful acquittal, where q ∈ (0, 1) sets the relative weights of these errors.
In testing the implications of this model, discussed below, GMP abstract from
jury-specific concepts about which subjects might have preconceived notions, replacing
them instead with colours. As their model forms the basis for those presented in the
paper, I will use this terminology throughout, including the remainder of the theoretical
discussion. In this version, isomorphic to the game above, a group of n voters are
assigned either a red jar or a blue jar, taking the roles of guilt and innocence respectively,
with the red jar assigned with probability ρ ∈ (0, 1). Each jar contains 10 balls, with
10p matching the colour of the jar and 10(1− p) matching the colour of the other jar.
Each subject then selects a ball from the assigned jar, with replacement, filling the role
of the juror’s signal with precision p.1 Each player then votes for either the red or blue
jar, with the group selecting the red jar (i.e. convicting the defendant) if at least r vote
for it, and the blue jar otherwise. I will refer to r = n, in which the group only selects
the red jar if all members vote for it, as red unanimity.
Let ω ∈ {r, b} denote the colour of the group’s assigned jar and s ∈ {r, b} a subject’s
selected ball. Define σ(r) and σ(b) to be the probability with which a subject votes for
the red jar when selecting a red and blue ball respectively. A subject votes responsively
when σ(r) 6= σ(b), and informatively when always voting for the jar that matches their
1This probability is equal across states in both the Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) and GMP
formulations, but there is no reason that this must be the case more generally.
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signal, σ(r) = 1, σ(b) = 0.2 Throughout, I follow Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998)
and GMP in fixing ρ = 1
2
, so that each state is equally likely, and in assuming that p
is equal across states. I follow the latter in fixing q = 1
2
, so that utility depends only
on whether the group’s decision matches the state, but is otherwise equal across states.
That is, correctly selecting the red jar and correctly selecting the blue jar result in the
same payoff, as do incorrectly selecting the red and blue jar.
The primary insight of Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) is that while previous jury-
voting models implicitly assumed that jurors would vote informatively, such behaviour
may not be rational and, more specifically, may not constitute an equilibrium. The
literature focuses in particular upon symmetric responsive equilibria.3 Under majority
voting the unique such equilibrium is informative voting. Under a more demanding
decision threshold, r > rM , the unique such equilibrium is σ(r) = 1 and
σ(b) =
pKn,r − (1− p)








That is, when more than a majority of the group must vote red in order to select
the red jar, in equilibrium players should vote red with positive probability even when
their own signal is blue. The comparative static of note is that, for a fixed n and p, this
probability is strictly increasing in the decision threshold, r. Moreover, Feddersen and
Pesendorfer (1998) find that under certain conditions higher decision thresholds result
in higher wrongful conviction rates in equilibrium, which contradicts their apparent
purpose.
2Here ‘informative’ is used as a shorthand for ‘perfectly informative’. Of course, σ(r) = 0, σ(b) = 1
would be equally informative, but is never observed in the standard game and is thus ignored.
3Responsiveness simply rules out those trivial equilibria in which players always vote for the same
jar regardless of signal; behaviour that is optimal only because each player has zero probability of
pivotality.
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The intuition for non-informative equilibria is simple: a player’s vote is pivotal when
exactly r − 1 other players have voted for the red jar, and n − r for the blue jar. If
other players vote informatively, r > rM then implies that the number of red signals
exceeds the number of blue signals even if the player’s own signal is blue. Thus the
player should vote for the red jar. The equilibrium attains where the common σ(b) is
large enough that the conditional probability of a red signal given a red vote is low
enough for the states to be conditionally equally likely when the player’s own signal is
blue.
On an individual level, then, different levels of understanding of pivotal calculus
may lead to different behaviours and, because rational behaviour is counter-intuitive
if r > rM , we expect to see deviations especially in such a case. A subject that
understands the informational content of their own signal, P (ω = s|s) > P (ω 6= s|s),
but not the importance of pivotality, will vote informatively. Such a subject is naive.
For those who understand the informative content of pivotality, behaviour may differ
not only from the naive, but also from other strategic subjects, as any σ(b) ∈ [0, 1] can
be optimal given plausible beliefs about others. If we assume, for simplicity, that
subjects form beliefs as if others are homogeneous, or at least drawn randomly from a
large population, then σ(b) = 1 is optimal when the ratio of these beliefs, σ(b)
σ(r)
, is below
the symmetric responsive equilibrium level, and σ(b) = 0 is optimal when this ratio is
above that level.
Experimentally, this results in difficulties determining what drives many behaviours,
all of which have been observed in previous experiments discussed below. Does a subject
vote informatively for strategic reasons or because she is naive to pivotal calculus?
Does she always vote red because her beliefs about others’ make it optimal to do so,
or is she incapable of understanding how the implications of pivotality change as other
subjects play σ(b) > 0 rather than voting informatively? Does she mix because she
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does have such an understanding, and grasps the nature of the equilibrium, or due
to changing beliefs about others, or doubt about her own pivotal reasoning? The
experiment presented in this paper seeks to shed light on these questions through
treatments utilizing computer players with known behaviour, thus fixing these beliefs,
and a within-subject design that allows comparison of behaviour in these games to
behaviour in the standard game.
Although not widely discussed in the literature, it is also plausible that apparently
strategic behaviour has drivers other than pivotal calculus. For example, a subject
might vote red despite a blue signal as a form of quasi-abstention, since a single blue
vote ensures that the group selects the blue jar and puts the subject at risk of the
responsibility of a unilateral decision. Alternately, subjects may simply wish to herd
in the face of uncertainty, and the vote-rule serves as an anchor for their beliefs about
others’ behaviour. The second computer-player game presented in this paper sheds
light on these questions by changing computer-player behaviour while retaining the
vote-rule, such that sophisticated play is different while the play induced by these
alternate drivers is unchanged.
1.2.1 Existing Evidence
Both Guarnaschelli, McKelvey, and Palfrey (2000), and Goeree and Yariv (2011), hence-
forth GY, employ the jar game described in the previous section, with subjects randomly
re-matched between rounds, jars equally likely (ρ = 1
2
), subjects paid an equal amount
for each correct group decision (q = 1
2
), and a signal strength of p = 0.7 for both jars.
n and r varies between treatments but is fixed between rounds within a treatment and
is known to subjects. The focus of both is on aggregate behaviour, which is summa-
rized in Table 1.1, with σˆ(s) representing the frequency of red votes conditional upon
signal s ∈ {r, b}. In each case, behaviour is largely informative under majority vot-
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ing,4 but σ(b) strictly increases as r increases to a supermajority (in GY), and then to
red unanimity r = n (in both). As well as matching the theorized comparative static
qualitatively, the results are also relatively close to the empirical point predictions.5
Table 1.1: Observed (and equilibrium) behaviour in previous experiments
n r σˆ(b) σˆ(r)
GMP 3 2 0.057 (0.000) 0.972 (1.000)
GMP 3 3 0.360 (0.314) 0.954 (1.000)
GMP 6 4 0.209 (0.000) 0.979 (1.000)
GMP 6 6 0.478 (0.651) 0.897 (1.000)
GY 9 5 0.07 (0.00) 0.91 (1.000)
GY 9 7 0.24 (0.31) 0.89 (1.000)
GY 9 9 0.39 (0.77) 0.90 (1.000)
It is worth noting, however, that both studies observe substantial heterogeneity
under red unanimity, including subjects responding to blue signals in all three ways:
by always voting blue, by always voting red, and by mixing. Thus these aggregate
measures provide an imperfect indication of the proportion of subjects that are capable
of pivotal calculus, and the earlier questions remain regarding the extent and nature
of these capabilities. While GMP do categorize subjects by individual behaviour -
whether they play σˆ(b) = 0, σˆ(b) ∈ (0, 1), or σˆ(b) = 1 - these classifications still leave
questions about subjects’ capabilities, as discussed above. For example, it is not clear
whether a subject playing σˆ(b) = 0 does so because of naivety or simply a belief that
the aggregate σˆ(b) is too high, in which case playing σˆ(b) = 0 is optimal. Likewise, it
is unclear whether a subject playing σˆ(b) ∈ (0, 1) does so strategically, or simply has
4The largest deviation occurs in σ(b) = 0.209 in GMP’s n = 6, r = 4 treatment, but is made less
surprising by the fact that in equilibrium a player receiving a blue signal should be indifferent between
the two jars. This contrasts to other treatments, in which one jar is strictly preferred.
5Regardless, theoretical predictions for group decision accuracy - the type I errors should decrease
and type II errors increase as the group size increases - are violated for both majority and unanimity
voting.
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a predilection for tremors. The experiment presented here seeks to ameliorate these
concerns, both by fixing beliefs and including σˆ(r) when classifying subjects’ behaviour.
Like this paper, Esponda and Vespa (2014), henceforth EV, move away from ques-
tions of institutional efficiency and a focus on aggregate outcomes to an investigation
of individual strategic capability, finding that subjects have difficulty conditioning on
hypothetical events in particular. They do so through a related design in which groups
consist of one subject and two computer players. Each computer player observes the
state directly then votes red when the state is red and mixes otherwise. Both this
mixing probability and the probability with which the state is red vary between rounds
but are known to the subject. Although the pivotal calculus is similar, the implica-
tion here is even sharper: the subject can only be pivotal when the state is blue, so
should always vote blue. Subjects’ actions differ, however, depending on whether vot-
ing is simultaneous or whether they first observe the computer players’ votes. In the
simultaneous case, in which pivotality is hypothetical, 78% are non-strategic, failing
to converge on always voting for the blue jar, compared to 24% when pivotality can
be directly observed. This gives the primary result, that the hypothetical nature of
pivotality drives much of subjects’ failure to act strategically in these games. Learning
effects also are also substantial, with subjects becoming more strategic over time; a
result that is found again in the experiment presented in this paper.
There are also differences between subjects’ behaviour in EV and the equivalent
treatments of GMP and GY, and the substantial differences in the games’ structures
leave it unclear as to what drives this. In particular, the EV results also show much
lower rates of strategic behaviour than GMP and GY when pivotality is not observer
and subjects are similarly experienced. When restricting to the first 15 rounds of the
treatment in which subjects vote without seeing computer player votes and receive
feedback after each round - the conditions most closely resembling each of GMP, GY,
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and the experiment presented below - subjects vote blue just 26.8% of the time when
the state is unconditionally more likely to be red - perhaps the closest proxy we can
draw for σˆ(b) in the jury voting game. Of concern is that this is not much greater than
the 21.5% probability with which subjects vote red when the state is unconditionally
more likely to be blue, behaviour which cannot be justified regardless of whether or not
a subject understands pivotality, akin to voting blue with a red signal in the standard
game.
It is unclear what drives such behaviour, but given its irrationality we must consider
that subjects may simply be confused. One possible cause of this is the computer play-
ers’ behaviour, which is both complex, in that it is semi-mixed and asymmetric in the
state, and unlike that which we would expect of a human player, in that they vote red
with some probability after observing a blue state. While the implication of pivotality
is mathematically simple - any blue computer vote implies a blue state - it is easy to
imagine that such a strategy may confuse subjects. The experiment presented here
tests this by adjusting computer-player behaviour, with results suggesting confusion
may indeed play a role.
We must also consider that perhaps the simple fact of playing with computer players
is enough to cause subjects difficulty. Moreover, it is worth noting that the observed
errors (voting for the red jar when the prior favours blue) mirror those of the com-
puter players (voting with some probability for the red jar when the state is blue)
suggesting that subjects’ may simply use computer player behaviour as a guide. The
experiment presented below finds little support for either of these hypotheses, however,
with subjects displaying little irrational behaviour when computer players play simple,
seemingly rational strategies, and differing from computer players in their irrational
deviations when they don’t.
While the above papers are the most relevant to the study prevented here, the jury
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voting literature - and strategic voting literature more generally - is much broader,
featuring many issues not yet discussed. One common theme, including in the papers
discussed above, is communication between voters. Coughlan (2000) seeks more realistic
models of jury voting, first adding the possibility for mistrial when neither outcome
receives enough votes, finding informative voting to be a symmetric equilibrium under
relatively lenient conditions, and then separately adding pre-vote communication via a
straw poll, finding equilibria in which voters truthfully reveal their signals then voting
for the most common. The latter is the secondary focus of GMP, who find that subjects
do generally reveal their signals truthfully, but may overweight their private information
when voting. Likewise, GY allow for free-form communication via a chat box, again
finding that subjects reveal information truthfully, then take into account the collective
information when voting, particularly when preferences are aligned.
Ali et al. (2008) recreate the unanimity no-communication treatments of GMP with
standing committees in which subjects are not randomly rematched between rounds,
finding negligible differences from GMP’s results. The same paper then considers the
case in which jurors vote sequentially, focusing on the rate at which subjects who may
still be pivotal - that is, all previous voters have voted to convict - vote also to convict.
While overall such subjects with innocent signals tend to vote guilty more often than
under simultaneous voting, the magnitude of the differences is perhaps smaller than we
would expect, particularly given the equivalent EV results, perhaps suggesting some
unrecognized differences between the games. Battaglini, Morton, and Palfrey (2008a)
similarly consider sequential voting, with the addition of voting costs and the possibility
of abstention under majority voting. As in previous majority voting results, subjects
generally vote informatively when not abstaining, although voting order and cost have
large effects on abstention decisions. Abstention decisions are further investigated in
Battaglini, Morton, and Palfrey (2008b), Bhattacharya, Duffy, and Kim (2014) and
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others.
Another strand of the literature investigates the impact of changes to the game’s
information structure. Kawamura and Vlaseros (2017) allow for a public signal in
addition to subjects’ private signals, finding that when the two disagree, subjects follow
the former more often than equilibrium would predict. Invernizzi (2018) further tests
a similar setup, finding that recency of information is of particular importance. Costly
information acquisition is also considered, with Großer and Seebauer (2016) are more
likely to acquire information under majority voting than unanimity voting. A different
take on information acquisition is considered in the Option Game presented below.
1.3 Experimental Design
1.3.1 Games
The experiment consists of five variants of the GMP game, each played with parameters
of n = 5, p = 0.7, and either majority (r = 3) or red unanimity (r = 5) voting. Each
game is played 15 times consecutively, with each subject playing all games, for a total
of 75 rounds, with the order outlined in Section 1.3.2. After each round subjects are
told their group’s decision, the number of votes for each jar, and the true colour of
the jar. A running tally of the subject’s correct group decisions is also available at all
times. All parameters remain identical between rounds.6
The five jury voting games are as follows, with equilibrium behaviour for each
summarized in Table 1.3a, along with aggregate results.
6Subjects also each played 15 rounds of the Charness and Levin (2009) single-player bidding game,
which is the focus of Chapter 2 but omitted from the remainder of this Chapter. 110 subjects played
this game before the jury voting games and 110 played it after. Regressions throughout the results
section find no difference in behaviour when subjects have previously played the bidding game, thus
justifying its omission.
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1.3.1.1 Human Game with Majority Voting (HGM) and Red Unanimity
(HGU)
The first two variants are simply the GMP game itself with majority (r = 3) and
red unanimity (r = 5) voting respectively, providing a baseline for comparison to the
previous experiments, and for examination of subjects’ apparent strategic abilities.
Groups consist of 5 human subjects and are randomly rematched between rounds.
The symmetric, responsive equilibria are sincere voting under majority, and σ(r) = 1,
σ(b) = 0.583 under red unanimity. The threshold belief ratio at which a subject
receiving a blue signal is indifferent between jars is thus σ(b)
σ(r)
= 0.583. As discussed
above, any σ(b) along with σ(r) = 1 can be a best response to plausible beliefs in HGU,
and some behaviours - most notably informative voting - are consistent with pivotal
understanding but may still be observed in those subjects not capable of it.
1.3.1.2 Informative Computer Game with Red Unanimity (ICG)
In ICG, each group consists of one subject and four computer players, each of which
randomly selects a ball from the jar, with replacement, then votes for the jar that
matches the selected ball. That is, each computer player acts exactly like a fully
informative subject. This behaviour is known to subjects. Group decisions are made
by red unanimity, r = 5.
Optimal behaviour in this game is to always vote for the red jar: σ(r) = σ(b) = 1.
To see this, note that pivotality implies all four computer players received red signals,
resulting in a conditional probability of a red state of 0.986 when the subject’s own ball
is red, and 0.927 when it is blue, and thus voting for the red jar is always optimal.
This treatment thus provides perhaps the simplest possible application of pivotal
reasoning in a jury voting environment: subjects are not required to form beliefs over
others’ strategies, the strategies are trivial, natural, and easily understood, and there
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is no need for statistical estimation, as it is clear that four red signals outweigh a
single blue signal without any calculation. Moreover, since the best response is a pure
strategy, and beliefs are anchored, we can more easily distinguish those who are capable
of pivotal understanding, as informative or mixing behaviour - which can be optimal
in HGU - are no longer so.
1.3.1.3 Reverse Computer Game with Red Unanimity (RCG)
RCG differs from ICG only in the computer players’ behaviour. Here each computer
player votes for the jar that does not match its selected ball. Pivotality still thus implies
four red votes, but that now implies four blue signals, and as such the subject should
always vote for the blue jar regardless of signal: σ(r) = σ(b) = 0.
This reverse informative strategy is in theory no more complicated than the standard
informative strategy played by computer players in ICG: it is also pure and informative,
and thus pivotal thinking demands no more strategic insight or mathematical capability,
nor requires subjects to vote against their private information any more than in ICG.
It should thus be no more difficult. The computer strategy is less natural than regular
informative voting, however, which may prove problematic to human subjects. The
comparison to ICG tests this.
Moreover, RCG separates those who are pivotally capable from those who appear
so in HGU and ICG but are actually motivated by social drivers. While the pivotally
capable switch to always voting blue, those who voted red in ICG simply to avoid
the responsibility of unilaterally assuring a blue group decision will continue to do so.
Likewise, since the vote rule remains unchanged at r = 5, those who use it as an anchor
for herding and thus vote red in ICG should also do the same here.
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1.3.1.4 Option Computer Game with Red Unanimity (OCG)
OCG differs from ICG in that at the beginning of each round, each subject is afforded
two options. Under the Information option the subject selects a ball from the jar as
previously, but their vote is then automatically cast for the jar matching their selected
ball. Under the Choice option the subject does not select a ball from the jar but chooses
which jar she wishes to vote for.7 Under both options, each computer player selects a
ball from the jar and then votes informatively, as in ICG.
I define σR as the probability with which a subject selects Choice and votes for the
red jar, and σB the probability with which she selects Choice and votes for the blue
jar. Given the computer behaviour is unchanged from ICG, optimal behaviour is again
to vote for the red jar regardless of signal, which can be achieved here by selecting
Choice and forgoing the signal altogether, that is σR = 1. This reasoning should be
clear to those who are pivotally capable. For those who are not so, it may be that the
instinctive value of private information may be too great to give up. The game thus
provides a test of the strength of subjects’ confidence in discarding their own private
information, and more generally of their ability to extend pivotal thinking from voting
decisions to more institutional decisions about the informational structure of the game
itself.
1.3.2 Order, Subjects, and Payments
The order of the five games, summarized in Table 1.2, varies between sessions along
two dimensions: whether HGM is played before or after HGU, and whether HGU is
played before or after ICG. While the former has no impact on results and is ultimately
ignored, the latter is important and discussed below. In each case, these three games
are followed by RCG and then OCG. This results in four basic orders, each played over
7In the laboratory the options are referred to only as Option A and Option B respectively.
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four sessions of either 10 or 15 subjects.8
Table 1.2: Treatment Orders
Treatment Order Subjects
Order 1 HGM - HGU - ICG - RCG - OCG 60
Order 2 HGU - HGM - ICG - RCG - OCG 50
Order 3 HGM - ICG - HGU - RCG - OCG 50
Order 4 ICG - HGM - HGU - RCG - OCG 60
Overall, 220 subjects took part in the experiment over 16 sessions at the Columbia
Experimental Laboratory for the Social Sciences (CELSS) from November 2016 to Oc-
tober 2017. The subject pool consists of Columbia students, primarily undergraduates.
Subjects were paid a $5 show-up fee and 25c for each of the 75 jury voting rounds in
which their group made a correct decision.9 Subjects also played two practice rounds
before the first jury voting game, and two more before OCG, in which the interface
updates to incorporate the option screen. Sessions lasted from 50 to 75 minutes, with
an average payment of $20.13.
The interface was programmed using the oTree software package (Chen et al. (2016))
and subjects recruited via ORSEE (Greiner (2004)). The experimental instructions are
in Appendix A.1 with the accompanying overheads in Appendix A.2 and the interface
presented in Appendix A.3.
8Within each order, exactly half of the subjects play the CL auction game before the jury games
and half play it after - with two sessions of each - but again this has no impact on the results and is
ultimately ignored, with results pooled.




Aggregate observed behaviour for each of the five games is displayed in Table 1.3a,
with (symmetric, responsive) equilibrium predictions in parentheses. σˆ(b) represents
the aggregate frequency with which subjects vote for the red jar conditional upon a blue
signal - the empirical equivalent of σ(b), while σˆ(r) is the same for red signals. In OCG,
σˆR shows the frequency with which subjects select Choice and vote for the red jar, with
σˆR the frequency with which they select Choice and vote for the blue jar. Table 1.3a
shows p-values for pairwise two-tailed permutation tests of the differences between these
frequencies, with differences between σˆ(b) below the diagonal and differences between
σˆ(r) above. These permutation tests are described in Appendix A.4.
Table 1.3: Aggregate Behaviour by Treatment.
Treatments σˆ(b) σˆ(r)
HGM 0.069 (0.000) 0.948 (1.000)
HGU 0.476 (0.583) 0.912 (1.000)
ICG 0.560 (1.000) 0.919 (1.000)
RCG 0.315 (0.000) 0.613 (0.000)
σˆR σˆB
OCG 0.653 (1.000) 0.054 (0.000)
(a) Observed (and equilibrium) behaviour.
Treatments HGM HGU ICG RCG
HGM 0.015 0.055 0.000
HGU 0.000 0.694 0.000
ICG 0.000 0.001 0.000
RCG 0.000 0.000 0.000
(b) p-values for between-treatment differences.
The aggregate results for the human group games fit well with those of GMP and
GY, with the aggregate strategy close to fully informative under majority voting, while
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under red unanimity σˆ(b) increases substantially and significantly. This increase is
in accordance with equilibrium predictions, although the magnitude of the change is
not as great. σˆ(b) increases further in ICG, which again is qualitatively consistent
with strategic behaviour, but falls further short of the equilibrium strategy. It is also
notable that σˆ(r) is significantly lower in each of HGU and ICG than HGM, despite a
theoretical prediction of σˆ(r) = 1 in each. It is not clear why this should be, although
it is perhaps relevant that it is lower - that is, subjects are more likely to vote blue in
contrast to a red signal - in the games where they are also more likely to vote red in
contrast to a blue signal.
OCG also appears to be well understood in the aggregate, with optimal behaviour -
selecting Choice and voting for the red jar - in almost two thirds of decisions. Subjects
rarely select Choice to vote for the blue jar, and select Information, and thus vote
informatively, with frequency 1− 0.653− 0.054 = 0.293.
RCG, however, is something of an outlier, with aggregate behaviour much further
from the equilibrium than in any of the other games. Relative to ICG, which is math-
ematically equivalent, subjects are less likely to cast the optimal vote - blue in RCG,
red in ICG - both when their signal matches that vote (1 − σˆ(b) = 0.685 in RCG and
σˆ(r) = 0.919 in ICG) and when it does not (1−σˆ(r) = 0.387 in RCG and σˆ(b) = 0.560),
with each of these differences significant with p < 0.001 using the permutation tests
described in Appendix A.4. Subjects’ apparent difficulty in RCG is discussed further
in Section 1.4.2.6.
In each game, however, a focus on aggregate results belies the substantial hetero-
geneity we see amongst subjects in all but HGM. The remainder of the analysis thus
focuses on individual behaviour.
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1.4.2 Individual Behaviour
Figure 1.1 shows individual voting behaviour for each of the jury voting games, with
each point representing the observed behaviour of one subject across 15 rounds of the
given treatment. Measures of behaviour are equivalent to those of the aggregate analysis
in the previous section. A small amount of random noise is added to each point such
that those which overlap can be seen. Histograms of the distributions over each axis,
which do not include this noise, are shown at the top and right of each chart. In all
charts, a red circle shows aggregate behaviour while a red diamond shows the symmetric
responsive equilibrium, each of which can be found in Table 1.3a. Table 1.4 classifies
subjects as relevant types for each game based on the same measures, showing counts
of those falling into each category.
Table 1.4: Individuals by Behaviour Type
σˆ(r) = 1 σˆ(r) < 1
σˆ(b) = 0 σˆ(b) ∈ (0, 1) σˆ(b) = 1
HGM 167 (75.9%) 20 (9.1%) 2 (0.9%) 31 (14.1%)
HGU 49 (22.3%) 68 (30.9%) 54 (24.5%) 49 (22.3%)
ICG 47 (21.4%) 42 (19.1%) 86 (39.1%) 45 (20.5%)
σˆB = 0 σˆB > 0
σˆR = 0 σˆR ∈ (0, 1) σˆR = 1
OCG 37 (16.8%) 27 (12.3%) 117 (53.2%) 39 (17.7%)
σˆ(r) = 1 σˆ(r) = 0 Other
σˆ(b) = 1 σˆ(b) = 0 σˆ(b) = 1 σˆ(b) = 0
RCG 24 (10.9%) 26 (11.8%) 3 (1.4%) 30 (13.6%) 137 (62.3%)
1.4.2.1 Majority Voting and Basic Rationality
Individual behaviour in HGM is generally very close to the equilibrium, with 167 of 220
subjects (75.9%) never deviating from informative voting. This suggests that subjects
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Figure 1.1: Individual Behaviour by Treatment.
(a) HGM (b) HGU
(c) ICG (d) RCG
(e) OCG
largely understand the game to at least the level of a naive Bayesian, recognizing that
a private signal of a given colour implies that the same coloured jar is conditionally
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more likely than the other.
Indeed, in each of HGU, ICG, and OCG, irrational deviations from informative
voting are rare - such as voting blue with a red signal in HGU or ICG, resulting in
σˆ(r) < 1, or selecting Choice and voting blue in OCG, resulting in σˆB > 0. This
further supports that subjects generally understand the game to at least a naive level.
RCG sees many more irrational deviations, however, and is discussed further below.
1.4.2.2 Red Unanimity and Strategic Behaviour
In HGU, heterogeneity in individual behaviour tells a more nuanced story than the
aggregate increase in σˆ(b). Now 49 of 220 subjects (22.3%) always vote informatively,
54 (24.5%) always vote red regardless of signal, and 68 (30.9%) always vote red given a





0.522, which is below the indifference threshold given homogeneous beliefs, 0.583, and
thus always voting red is the best response to the aggregate distribution. However
the similarity of the observed and equilibrium ratios make beliefs on either side of
the equilibrium threshold appear reasonable, particularly given the limited information
available to subjects with which to form these beliefs. Thus any strategy in which
σˆ(r) = 1 can be consistent with pivotal understanding, and therefore up to 171 subjects
(77.7%) may be acting strategically without error; the HGU data alone cannot tell us
more about whether they understand pivotal calculus or are driven by something else.
More about this potential for rational heterogeneity is discussed below.
By controlling beliefs, ICG removes much of this ambiguity. There, the 47 subjects
(21.4%) who vote informatively cannot be doing so optimally, but rather must fail to
grasp the implications of pivotality. Likewise, the 42 (19.1%) who mix when receiving
a blue signal and always vote red given a red signal, can no longer be doing so as part
of an optimal strategy. More about mixing is said below. 86 (39.1%) play optimally,
always voting red. Note in particular that this proportion is lower than the 77.7% of
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subjects whose behaviour is consistent with an understanding of pivotal calculus in
HGU. This suggests that the figure for HGU may indeed be inflated by the ambiguity
of informative voting, which can be driven by naivety or sophistication.
As in ICG, optimal behaviour is unambiguous in OCG. There, 117 subjects (53.2%)
always play optimally, σˆR = 1. That is, these subjects are willing to eschew their
private information altogether in order to select Choice and vote for the red jar. 37
(16.8%) never select Choice, σˆR = σˆB = 0, instead receiving private information and
thus voting informatively. By valuing private information in a setting in which pivotal
calculus leads to red votes regardless of this information, these subjects show themselves
to be unaware of this reasoning and incapable of pivotal calculus. Notably, however,
the number doing this is lower than the number who always vote informatively in HGU
and ICG, although this may simply be the result of greater experience (since OCG is
always played last) leading to more sophisticated behaviour, as discussed below. 39
subjects (17.7%) select Choice and vote for the blue jar at least once - behaviour which
is never optimal.
RCG sees much more heterogeneity and less consistency in individual behaviour.
The number of subjects who always vote optimally - in this case, for the blue jar
regardless of signal - drops to 30 of 220 (13.6%). 24 (10.9%) continue to always vote red,
despite no longer being optimal, and 26 (11.8%) vote informatively. Just as noticeable
is the 65 (29.5%) that now have non-pure empirical frequencies given both signals,
appearing in the interior of Figure 1.1d. This is more than three times the 17 (7.7%)
who do the same in ICG, despite the computer player strategies being mathematically
identical. These unusual results are discussed further in Section 1.4.2.6.
1.4.2.3 Experience, Learning, and Knowledge Transfer
HGU and ICG I turn now to changes in subjects’ behaviour over time, with a
particular focus on HGU and ICG, for which there are interesting order and experience
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effects. Table 1.5 shows logistic regressions of the probability of a red vote in HGU and
ICG, with each column restricting to different signals, treatments, and/or orders. Each
of these two treatments is denoted first in sessions in which it is played before the other,
and second in sessions in which it is played after the other. Independent variables are
the round number within each treatment (1 to 15) and a series of dummies - for ICG,
for whether the treatment is first of the two in that session, and for whether subjects
have already played HGM.10
Table 1.5: Logit Regressions of Probabilty of Red Vote by Treatment, Order, and
Signal.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Treatment Both Both HGU ICG HGU HGU ICG ICG
Order Both Both Both Both First Second First Second
Ind. Variable σˆ(r) σˆ(b) σˆ(b) σˆ(b) σˆ(b) σˆ(b) σˆ(b) σˆ(b)
Constant 2.016 0.417 0.458 0.700 -0.638 0.289 -0.135 0.470
0.000 0.165 0.255 0.096 0.020 0.278 0.664 0.089
ICG 0.123 0.348
0.468 0.001
Round 0.001 0.001 -0.011 0.015 0.068 -0.012 0.053 0.016
0.958 0.947 0.437 0.265 0.000 0.433 0.001 0.267
First 0.006 -1.019 -1.189 -0.832
0.987 0.000 0.000 0.013
First*Round -0.017 0.061 0.079 0.038
0.555 0.000 0.000 0.076
HGM Prev 0.530 -0.158 -0.078 -0.236 -0.080 -0.236
0.112 0.507 0.810 0.496 0.806 0.497
Obs 3,355 3,245 1,657 1,588 820 837 797 791
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by subject, with p-values presented below coefficient
estimates.
Before discussing learning results, I first note the treatment effects between HGU
and ICG, seen through Columns (1) and (2), which consider both games and segment
the data by signal. These results agree with those of the earlier analyses: there is no
10In all regressions, dummies for having already played the Charness and Levin (2009) bidding
game are insignificant and thus omitted.
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difference in behaviour between the two treatments when subjects receive red signals,
but given a blue signal, the increase in the likelihood of a red vote from HGU to ICG
is both large and highly significant.
The regressions show substantial evidence that learning plays an important role
in these two games when subjects receive blue signals. Moreover, this learning is not
uniform throughout the session, but occurs only through the first of the two treatments
played in each session. This can be seen in the fact that the coefficient on the round
number is significant only in those regressions that restrict to the first treatment of
each session (Columns 5 and 7), or when interacted with the First dummy in the
regressions that pool over orders (Columns 2 through 4), and is insignificant otherwise.
The coefficient is positive, and the magnitudes similar, in each case in which it is
significant, implying that σˆ(b) increases through time. It is worth noting, however,
that the point estimates are smaller and less significant in ICG than HGU, perhaps
reflecting that there is less to learn about, given beliefs about others’ behaviour are
fixed.
In each of the regressions that pool data over both orders, Columns 2 through 4, we
also see that the coefficient on the First dummy itself is large, negative, and significant
at a high level.
Together, these results tell us that in the first red unanimity treatment that subjects
play - either HGU or ICG - σˆ(b) begins relatively low but increases, while in the second
it begins higher but then does not continue to increase. This is supported by Figure
1.2, which shows the aggregate σˆ(b) for each round of the two games, divided by order.
An interesting implication of these results is that that which subjects are learning
in the first of these game appears to then be applied to the second - that is, the increase
in σˆ(b) through the first carries over into the second. This suggests that subjects must
be learning about something common to the two games, such as red unanimity and
25
the resulting pivotal calculus, rather than something that differs, such as beliefs about
others’ strategies, which are fixed in ICG. Moreover, the fact that experience in each of
HGU and ICG has such an effect on the other, but that prior experience in HGM has
no effect on either - as shown in the insignificant coefficients on the HGM Prev dummy
- suggests that it must be red unanimity that subjects are learning about.
Figure 1.2: Aggregate Behaviour Given Blue Signal in HGU and ICG by Order
There is also some evidence that this learning manifests in one-time insights rather
than random exploration or short-sighted reactions to gains and losses. In particular,
I distinguish here between persistent behavioural changes, which are consistent with
insights, such as that of pivotal understanding, and non-persistent changes, which are
not. To this end, I classify a subject as switching if after the first time they vote red with
a blue signal they do so for the remainder of the treatment, and as mixing otherwise,
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that is if after voting red with a blue signal they later return to voting blue.11 Since
such a classification is sensitive to random errors in actions, I restrict here to those 175
subjects who play σˆ(r) = 1 across both treatments, which I take as a sign that they
are less prone to this. Table 1.6 shows that switching is substantially more common in
the first treatment each subject plays than in the second (significant in a difference of
proportions test with p = 0.017), but that switching rates do not differ between the two
treatments. Mixing rates, however, are the same in subjects’ first and last treatments,
but is significantly more common (p = 0.026) in HGU, where it may be rational, than
ICG, where it is not. These results are consistent with the notion that switching is due
to subjects learning about something common to the two games, and that this largely
occurs in the first of these two treatments then persists to the second.
Table 1.6: Switching and Mixing subject counts by treatment and experience
Mix Switch Total
Total 51 45 96
HGU 38 22 60
ICG 13 23 36
First 25 33 58
Second 26 12 38
Given the clear importance of learning in these games, it is instructive in classifying
subjects’ overall capabilities to consider their behaviour when most experienced. Figure
1.3 shows each subject’s behaviour in the last half (rounds 9-15) of the second HGU or
ICG treatment that each subject plays. Since each subject only plays one of these games
second, the charts each feature 110 subjects, and are thus less dense than those of Figure
11Note that this may yet exclude some who develop pivotal capability, including, for example, those
who mix as a form of exploration before switching to always voting red, but avoids arbitrary switching
thresholds as would be required for a more inclusive definition.
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1.1, but the contrasts are clear. Aggregate behaviour and individual classifications are
presented in Table 1.7.
Figure 1.3: Individual Behaviour when Experienced (HGU and ICG)
(a) HGU (last 7 rounds) (b) ICG (last 7 rounds)
Table 1.7: Aggregate Behaviour and Individuals by Behaviour Type when Experienced
(HGU and ICG)
Aggregates σˆ(r) = 1 σˆ(r) < 1
σˆ(b) σˆ(r) σˆ(b) = 0 σˆ(b) ∈ (0, 1) σˆ(b) = 1
HGU 0.516 0.932 32 (29.1%) 21 (19.1%) 43 (39.1%) 14 (12.7%)
ICG 0.615 0.931 29 (26.4%) 1 (0.9%) 68 (61.8%) 12 (10.9%)
The most stark result is that mixing has all but disappeared as a strategy in ICG,
despite figuring substantially in the overall data presented in Figure 1.1 and Table
1.4, with just one subject mixing when experienced. This compares to 21 mixing
subjects in HGU (significant in a difference of proportions test with p ≈ 0.000). The
difference is accounted for by more experienced subjects always voting red in ICG than
in HGU (p = 0.001). Notably, these differences are consistent with theory, with always
voting red the only rational strategy in ICG, but mixing also rationalizable in HGU.
The treatments do not differ significantly in the number of subjects that always vote
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informatively, or that play σˆ(r) < 1. The aggregate difference in σˆ(b), significant at
p = 0.007 by the permutation test described in Appendix A.4, is thus driven by the
differences in mixing and red-voting behaviour.
Overall, some 68 of 110 (61.8%) play optimally in ICG when experienced, always
voting red. If we take informative voting in HGU to be naive rather than sophisticated,
as discussed above, then some 64 (58.2%) play optimally in HGU when experienced,
playing σˆ(r) = 1 and σˆ(b) > 0. These proportions are not significantly different.
Finally, it is interesting to note that in both groups, those who maintain σˆ(r) < 1
once experienced largely play σˆ(b) = 0, suggesting that blue votes given red signals
are driven by something more fundamental than a tendency towards randomization.
That it persists in both treatments implies that it is not simply a (misguided) reaction
to others subjects’ unusual behaviour, but since such votes are never optimal for any
beliefs in either treatment it is not clear what might drive such behaviour.
HGM, RCG, and OCG Table 1.8 presents learning regressions for each of the
remaining jury voting games. Columns 1 through 4 present logistic regressions of the
probability of a vote for the red jar conditional upon each signal type for each of HGM
and RCG. Columns 5 and 6 present logistic regressions of the probability of selecting
Choice followed by each vote colour - that is σˆR and σˆB respectively - in OCG. The
HGM regression includes dummies for prior experience in HGU and ICG. These are
not relevant for RCG and OCG, which always follow the other games.12
In HGM, there is no evidence of learning for either signal type. This likely reflects
the fact that the optimal behaviour coincides with what we would expect of a naive
subject - i.e. informative voting - and that subjects arrive relatively quickly at this
behaviour. That is, since there is no distinction between naive behaviour and sophis-
12As above, in all regressions dummies for having already played the Charness and Levin (2009)
bidding game are insignificant and thus omitted.
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Table 1.8: Logit Regressions of Probabilty of Red Vote by Treatment and Signal.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment HGM HGM RCG RCG OCG OCG
Ind. Variable σˆ(r) σˆ(b) σˆ(r) σˆ(b) σˆR σˆB
Constant 2.947 -2.465 0.670 -0.500 0.480 -3.314
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.011 0.000
Round -0.011 -0.025 -0.034 -0.044 0.021 0.012
0.717 0.328 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.360
HGU Prev 0.231 -0.109
0.672 0.814
ICG Prev 0.064 -0.214
0.906 0.677
Obs 1,638 1,662 1,715 1,585 3,300 3,300
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by subject, with p-values presented below coefficient
estimates.
ticated behaviour, there is not as much for subjects to learn given a naive starting
point.
In RCG there is evidence of learning, with the coefficient on the round variable
negative and highly significant for both signals. Since optimal behaviour is to always
vote for the blue jar, the negative coefficient reflects improvement over time. Recall
that subjects playing RCG have already played HGU and ICG and, as per the above
discussion, do not learn through the second of these. That they return to learning
in RCG underlines the implication from the aggregate results that RCG is in some
way different to, and perhaps more difficult than, the other games, despite the pivotal
calculus being mathematically identical to ICG. More is said about RCG in Section
1.4.2.6.
OCG shows similar learning results. Here the pivotal calculus is identical to ICG
- pivotality implies four red computer signals, which implies a red vote is optimal
regardless of the signal - which in this case should lead subjects to select Choice and
vote for the red jar. Again, however, the rate at which subjects do this increases over
time, despite subjects already having played HGU and ICG. Like RCG, that subjects
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continue to learn here suggests that OCG imposes some additional difficulty upon
subjects beyond simply red unanimity and the resulting pivotal calculus. That is, the
decision between Choice and Information is non-trivial, even with subjects experienced
enough to have exhausted the learning opportunities of the earlier red unanimity games.
1.4.2.4 HGU and Heterogeneous Strategic Voting
The comparison between HGU and ICG also sheds light upon a difficult and previously
unanswered question, namely which strategies are played in HGU by those who are
pivotally capable. In particular, while both informative voting and mixing can be
rational in HGU, it has been unclear whether those playing such strategies do so due
to pivotal thinking and appropriate beliefs, or due to other drivers.
Informative voting provides an especially difficult case in that, while it can be ratio-
nal, it is also the behaviour we expect to see from those naive subjects who understand
the basic information structure of the game but do not understand the importance of
pivotality. The results here, however, suggest that sophisticated subjects do not vote
informatively. To see this, we use the fact that informative voting in ICG can only be
explained by naivety, and thus use its prevalence there - 47 of 220 subjects (21.4%)
overall and 29 of 110 (26.4%) when experienced - as a baseline estimate of the naivety
amongst the subject pool. That its prevalence in HGU is almost identical - 49 of 220
subjects (22.3%) overall and 32 of 110 (29.1%) when experienced - suggests that sub-
jects are not voting informatively in HGU for reasons beyond the naivety observed in
ICG.
Within-subject evidence is presented in Table 1.9, which classifies subjects by ob-
served strategies across both of HGU and ICG.13 Of those 33 subjects who always vote
red when playing ICG first, the only behaviour consistent with pivotal capability, just
13As above, I restrict the analysis to those who play σˆ(r) = 1 through both treatments in order to
minimize the effects of those with a tendency for random exploration or errors.
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Table 1.9: Individual behaviour in HGU and ICG by treatment and order
ICG (Second)
HGU (First) Inform. Red Switch Mix Total
Inform. (σˆ(b) = 0) 16 3 5 0 24
Red (σˆ(b) = 1) 0 17 1 0 18
Switch (σˆ(b) ∈ (0, 1)) 1 16 2 0 19
Mix (σˆ(b) ∈ (0, 1)) 0 11 1 4 16
Total 17 47 9 4
(a) HGU (First) and ICG (Second)
HGU (Second)
ICG (First) Inform. Red Switch Mix Total
Inform. (σˆ(b) = 0) 13 1 2 6 22
Red (σˆ(b) = 1) 1 23 1 8 33
Switch (σˆ(b) ∈ (0, 1)) 2 8 0 4 14
Mix (σˆ(b) ∈ (0, 1)) 2 3 0 4 9
Total 18 35 3 22
(b) ICG (First) and HGU (Second)
one (3.0%) votes informatively when later playing HGU. This is clearly lower than
the 17 of 45 (38.6%) of those who play other strategies when playing ICG first (sig-
nificant in a difference of proportions test with p ≈ 0.000). Likewise, of the 24 who
vote informatively when playing HGU first, just 3 switch to always voting red in ICG
(12.5%), which is lower than those 44 of 53 (83.0%) who play other strategies in HGU
(p ≈ 0.000).
Likewise mixed strategies, that is σˆ(r) = 1, σˆ(b) ∈ (0, 1), have multiple possible
drivers in HGU. While the symmetric responsive equilibrium predicts this behaviour
in response to the belief that the aggregate strategy mixes similarly and in the cor-
rect ratio, it may also be driven by random errors from those otherwise playing pure
strategies, or by those switching from one pure strategy to the other, as discussed above.
Here, the contrast in prevalence between HGU and ICG, the latter of which shuts down
rationality as a driver by fixing beliefs but should have no impact on subject’s tendency
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towards errors or uncertainty, is telling. As discussed above, this is most starkly seen
amongst those who are experienced, where 22 of 110 (19.1%) mix in HGU but just one
(0.9%) does so in ICG (p ≈ 0.000), strongly suggesting that this mixing in HGU is
driven by rationality.
Again, within-subject evidence supports this, with 9 of the 33 (24.2%) who always
vote red when playing ICG first proceeding to play σˆ(b) ∈ (0, 1) in HGU, roughly in
line with the 16 of 45 (35.6%) of others who do so. Likewise, 27 of the 35 (77%) who
play σˆ(b) ∈ (0, 1) when playing HGU first then always vote red in ICG, significantly
more than the 20 of 42 (47.6%) of others who do so (p = 0.016).
Of course, it may not be that all such behaviour is genuine mixing. As discussed
above, more than a third of those playing σˆ(b) ∈ (0, 1) in HGU are in fact switching,
which may be indicative of those developing insights about the game and switching
from one pure strategy to another. Regardless, there is substantial evidence for genuine
mixing among the pivotally capable - and thus presumably beliefs that others are also
pivotally capable - in HGU.
1.4.2.5 OCG and Strategic Behaviour
As discussed above, the fact that subjects learn through OCG even after they have
stopped learning in HGU and ICG suggests that the new task it presents is not triv-
ially different to the tasks in those games. How, then, does subjects’ behaviour relate
between these games? In general, behaviour in OCG is as if those who appear to be
capable of pivotal thinking in HGU and ICG truly are, and those who don’t appear so
are not. As OCG is played last of the five jury voting games, I again classify subjects’
behaviour in those earlier games according to their play when most experienced - that
is, in the last 7 rounds of the second red unanimity treatment played, as in the previ-
ous section. Of those 111 who always vote red there, 91 (82.0%) always select Choice
and vote red in OCG, while just six such subjects (5.4%) always choose Information.
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Subjects who have previously displayed pivotal capability thus largely appear capable
of eschewing private information in order to vote red.
Likewise, of those 61 who vote informatively when experienced in the earlier red
unanimity games, 28 (45.9%) always choose Information in OCG. However 10 (16.4%)
always choose Choice and vote red, thus playing optimally.14 This behaviour is not
easily explained, but perhaps the most plausible cause is simply that since OCG is
played last of all the jury voting games they have had additional time to learn.
Overall, behaviour in OCG aligns well with an understanding of pivotal calculus,
particularly amongst those whose behaviour is consistent with it in previous treatments.
That performance is worse than ICG, as discussed above, suggests that the additional
element is non-trivial, but the division of subjects’ capabilities seems similar between
the two games.
1.4.2.6 The Reverse Computer Game
Throughout, behaviour in RCG has been something of an outlier. As well as aggregate
behaviour being further from theoretical predictions than other treatments, individual
behaviour is notably more heterogeneous and less consistent, with each semi-mixed
strategy observed, along with complete mixing. Many of these strategies cannot be
easily explained. This comes despite the fact that, in theory, the pivotal calculus is no
more complicated than in ICG.
One possible explanation is that subjects are accustomed to the previous computer
behaviour (that is, that of ICG) and take time to come to understand that the implica-
tions of pivotality are now reversed, thus appearing to be mixing when really switching.
Indeed some 29 (21.2%) of those 137 who cast votes in both directions appear to be
switching, which I define equivalently to the above - that is, as always voting blue with
14Four of these played ICG after HGU and are thus classified based on that behaviour, so it is not
simply the case that this informative voting may have been rational.
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a red signal once doing so for the first time. We can see the results of this in Figure
1.4b, which restricts to only data from the last 7 rounds of RCG, and shows much less
apparent mixing than Figure 1.4a, which uses all rounds (and thus simply recreates
Figure 1.1d).
Figure 1.4: Individual Behaviour, Reverse Computer Game
(a) All Rounds (b) Last 7 Rounds
Even with experience, however, many fewer play optimally than in previous treat-
ments. Just 55 (25.0%) always vote blue when experienced (i.e. in the last 7 rounds of
RCG), while 33 (15.0%) continue to always vote red, which is now the strategy with
the lowest expected payoff. This includes 30 (27.0%) of those 111 who always voted
red in the earlier red unanimity games when experienced, suggesting that they were
capable of pivotal reasoning.
As discussed in Section 1.2, one possible explanation for the failure to play rationally
here is that while the computer players’ behaviour is no more complex mathematically
than in ICG, it is far enough from expected or ‘reasonable’ behaviour - in fact, it
clearly works against subjects’ best interests in that computer players sometimes for
red given a blue state - that subjects find it more difficult to reason about, and become
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confused. While there is no clear reason why this should cause subjects’ reasoning to
fail, this confusion hypothesis is supported by the fact that subjects don’t simply revert
to naive informative voting, but in many cases do worse than this. In particular, 84
of 220 (38.2%) of subjects are more likely to vote against their information when it
is irrational to do so than when it is rational (σˆ(b) > 1 − σˆ(r)). This is much more
common than in ICG, where 33 of 220 (15.0%) do the equivalent (1− σˆ(r) > σˆ(b)).
As discussed above, equivalent behaviour is seen in the equivalent treatment (si-
multaneous, with feedback) of Esponda and Vespa (2014), in which the semi-mixed
computer-player strategies may also be seen as unusual or confusing. There, subjects’
information takes the form of a prior rather than a signal, but the results are similar.
Over the first 15 rounds, which gives the same amount of experience as those playing
RCG here, 30 of 58 subjects (52.7%) vote red with a blue prior more often than they
vote blue with a red prior - that is, they vote against their information more often when
it is irrational to do so than when it is rational. That subjects are apparently confused
by the mathematically simple computer play of RCG makes it easier to believe that
they could be similarly confused in Esponda and Vespa (2014), and goes some way to
explaining the lower levels of strategic behaviour seen in that paper relative to other
existing studies using the more standard game, discussed in Section 1.2.1.
It seems clear, then, that while subjects may appear strategic elsewhere, it is not
necessarily the case that these capabilities extend well to even very closely related
games. Where exactly the breakdown occurs warrants further investigation.
1.5 Conclusions
Overall, the variations on the Guarnaschelli et al. (2000) game presented here provide
encouraging evidence for subjects’ understanding of some amount of pivotal calculus.
Perhaps the cleanest test of this is the Informative Computer Game, which simplifies the
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pivotal calculus relative to games played in human groups. There, 39.1% of subjects
act optimally throughout, increasing to 61.8% when subjects are experienced. This
behaviour correlates strongly with apparently sophisticated behaviour in the basic jury
voting game with human groups, in that those who appear sophisticated in one are more
likely to appear so in the other, supporting the idea that those who have appeared as
if they were sophisticated in previous experiments may truly be so. Learning also
plays an important role, as previously suggested by Esponda and Vespa (2014). Much
apparent mixing behaviour appears to be a result of subjects switching from pure
informative voting to pure strategic voting (that is, always voting red), rather than
actual randomization. Notably, however, mixing persists once subjects are experienced
in HGU, where it is potentially rational, but not in ICG, where it is not.
Further support for pivotal thinking is found in many subjects’ willingness to forgo
private information in order to behave strategically in the Option Game. Moreover, a
substantial proportion of subjects that vote informatively in the human games continue
to do so in the ICG and Option treatments, implying that their behaviour in the human-
group games was a result of lacking pivotal understanding, rather than due to forming
beliefs about others that make such behaviour optimal. There is evidence, however,
that those who mix in human-group games do so due to pivotal reasoning.
Finally, however, the results of the RCG treatment suggest that if subjects truly do
understand pivotality, their ability to respond optimally to this understanding must be
limited, as a large majority of previously sophisticated subjects fail to behave optimally
in the face of this new group-mate behaviour. Alternately, it may be that some subjects
have alternate drivers of seemingly-strategic behaviour, such as a desire to herd or
abstain, that does not track with pivotal understanding in all games. In either case,
the external validity of subjects’ apparent pivotal capabilities is not guaranteed, even
in closely related games. Further, this suggests that a failure of pivotal capability can
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be driven not just by a failure to condition on hypothetical events, as per Esponda and
Vespa (2014), but also in the information extraction stage, even for those who appear







Many games ask players to make inferences about the state of the world from other
players’ actions or other state-dependent events. Distinct among them are those in
which these events are hypothetical in that they have not yet and may not occur. This
paper focusses on two such games - jury voting games and a single-player equivalent
of a common value auction - and investigates whether this common element leads to
common capability within subjects playing both, as is often assumed.
In the canonical model of jury voting due to Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) and
Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) a small group determine through voting whether to
convict or acquit a passive defendant. The jury does not observe whether the defendant
is guilty or innocent, each of which is equally likely, but rather each juror receives an
independent noisy signal of guilt then votes for either outcome. The defendant is
convicted if the number of conviction votes exceeds some threshold and is acquitted
otherwise, with jurors rewarded when a guilty defendant is convicted or an innocent
defendant acquitted. The crucial insight of the model is that an optimizing player
should condition on her own hypothetical pivotality, and thus her own vote’s payoff-
relevance. That is, if conviction requires r votes then she should vote as if r − 1
others will vote for it, despite a generally low probability that this occurs. If r is high
enough relative to the size of the group, the informational content of these hypothetical
votes may induce her to vote for conviction even when this contradicts her own private
signal. Amazingly, Guarnaschelli, McKelvey, and Palfrey (2000) and Goeree and Yariv
(2011) show that many subjects display behaviour consistent with this. Yet crucially,
Esponda and Vespa (2014) show, through a related setup, that the hypothetical nature
of pivotality causes subjects considerable difficulty, with many more capable of the
same informational inferences when pivotality is already observed.
In a common value auction, meanwhile, players bid for a prize after each receiving
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independent noisy signals about its randomly drawn but unobserved value, with the
highest bidder receiving that value in exchange for their bid. Here the relevant hypo-
thetical event is that a player makes the winning bid - or, said another way, that each
other player’s private information led them to make lower bids. A sophisticated player
should recognize that the prize’s expected value conditional upon winning the auction -
and thus making a transaction - is lower than its value conditional only upon her private
signal, and should decrease her bid accordingly. Failure to do so results in overbids and
expected losses - the so-called Winner’s Curse, first described by Capen et al. (1971).
Charness and Levin (2009) discuss substantial previous evidence of the Winner’s Curse
in various settings before presenting experimental evidence that it occurs extensively
even in a simplified single-player environment.
Common to both games is that a hypothetical event, necessary to the payoff-
relevance of one’s action, makes clear implications about the state of the world and
thus the player’s optimal action. Although there are differences between them - most
notably that a player’s bid in a common value auction impacts the probability that the
hypothetical event occurs, while their jury vote does not - it seems reasonable to con-
clude that the insights required for one carry over to the other. Surely the capability to
condition upon the hypothetical - which Esponda and Vespa (2014) refer to as hypothet-
ical thinking - applies to both, and for this reason the two games are commonly linked,
both in common usage and the literature. Esponda and Vespa (2014), for example,
in presenting a jury-voting experiment, utilize common-value auctions as the primary
motivating example, and freely connect their results to those of the auction game of
Charness and Levin (2009). A second paper, Esponda and Vespa (2019), tests the
extent to which one aspect of hypothetical thinking, the sure-thing principle, connects
these and other games. Koch and Penczynski (2018) suggest that a transformation of
an auction game to remove conditional reasoning could be similarly used in jury voting
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and persuasion games. Perhaps the clearest connect between the two is due, like the
canonical jury game itself, to Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996):
“Both in auctions and in elections an agent’s action only matters in
particular circumstances: when an agent is the high bidder in an auction or
when an agent is a swing voter in an election. In either case, when other
agents have private information that may be useful to an agent, the agent
must condition his action not only on his information but also on what-
must be true about the world if his action matters.”
A more general common element - that players must make make inferences about
others’ information from their actions, whether hypothetical or not - is the focus of
Eyster and Rabin (2005) cursed equilibrium. The authors seek to reconcile equilibrium
theory with the observation that experimental subjects often fail to respond fully to
the informational implications of others’ actions. To this end they present a model
in which each player, when forming beliefs about others’ strategies, will with some
positive probability fail to recognize that different types will act in different ways,
instead assigning them the average strategy across all types. Relative to standard
equilibria, this results in higher bids in common value auctions and less strategic voting
in jury voting games. Given the extent to which the cursed equilibrium model is
associated with the games presented here, I discuss it in the context of the results for
both, but find it adds little to our understanding of the data.
The primary purpose of this paper is to test this link between these games through
a within-subject design in which subjects play both games, allowing direct investigation
of whether capability in one correlates to capability in the other. To my knowledge,
only one other experiment, Esponda and Vespa (2019), sees subjects play versions of
both games. There, however, the relationship between play in one game and play in
the other is not reported, with the focus instead on changes in play across multiple
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versions of each game. Moreover, the focus on testing the implications of the sure-thing
principle necessitates that each game is significantly transformed, and each is played
only once each, in contrast to the experiment presented here in which the canonical
versions of each are played for multiple rounds each.
2.2 Experimental Design and Game Results
The experiment presented here features a within-subject design in which subjects play
15 rounds each of six games: an auction game designed by Charness and Levin (2009),
designed to investigate the winner’s curse, and five variations on the jury voting game
designed by Guarnaschelli, McKelvey, and Palfrey (2000). The auction game and its
results are presented in Section 2.2.1 and the jury games and their results in Section
2.2.2. This primary focus of this paper is the relationship between the auction and jury
voting games, presented in Section 2.3, while the relationships between the five jury
voting games are the focus of Chapter 1.
The experiment was conducted over 16 sessions with 220 subjects at the Columbia
Experimental Laboratory for the Social Sciences (CELSS) from November 2016 to
October 2017. Of these, 110 played the auction game before the five jury voting games,
and 110 played it after. The order of the jury voting treatments also varies, as outlined
in Section 2.2. The subject pool consists of Columbia students, primarily undertaking
undergraduate studies. Subjects were paid a $5 show-up fee, 25c for each of the 75 jury
voting rounds in which their group made a correct decision, and 25c for each 120 points
earned in the auction game. Sessions lasted from 50 to 75 minutes, with an average
payment of $20.13.
The interface was programmed using the oTree software package (Chen et al. (2016))
and subjects recruited via ORSEE (Greiner (2004)). Experimental instructions are
presented in Appendix A.1 of Chapter 1, the jury voting interface in Appendix A.3 of
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Chapter 1, and the auction game interface in Appendix B.1.
2.2.1 Auction Game
2.2.1.1 Design
The Charness and Levin (2009) auction game was designed as a single-person variation
of Samuelson and Bazerman (1985) ‘Acquire a Company’ game (itself an application of
the Akerlof (1970) ‘lemons’ model), in which a player bids on a company of unknown
value, acquiring it if her bid is high enough.
In each round, the subject is endowed with 120 points, and is shown an array of
100 virtual cards numbered 20 through 119 inclusive, arranged in random order with
these values hidden.1 The subject is asked to make a whole-numbered bid, b, from 0 to
120 inclusive, and then selects a card, effectively drawing a value from U [20, 119]. The
number on this card, its value v, is then revealed. If the subject’s bid is at least the
value of the revealed card, the subject pays their bid and receives 1.5 times the value




1.5v − b if b ≥ v
0 if b < v
For a given bid, the expected payoff, net of endowment, is given by
E[pi|b] = P [v ≤ b] · E[1.5v − b|v ≤ b] =








− b] if b ∈ [20, 119]
0 if b < 20
1The game is thus equivalent to Charness and Levin’s ‘Shifted-100VT’ treatment.
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Figure 2.1 shows this expected payoff for each possible bid. Subjects are told their
payoff at the end of each round, and at the end of the session are paid 25 cents for
every 120 points earned, rounded up to the nearest 25c.
Figure 2.1: Expected Net Payoff by Bid in the Auction Game
Solving for the optimal bid, b = 40, is not trivial given that b impacts both terms of
the expectation. A less demanding standard is that subjects avoid overbids - bids
which have negative net expectation, b > 60, which depends only on the sign of
E[1.5v − b|v ≤ b] = 1.5 · E[v|v ≤ b] − b. While generally this requires us to take
expectations over the distribution of b, which we cannot expect subjects in the lab to
do, the uniform distribution used here means that reasonable rules of thumb lead to the
correct answer. In particular, since E[v|v ≤ b] = v¯(b) where v¯(b) is the median of the
range [20, b] - that is, the median of all values that lead to a transaction - a bid b gives
an expected loss if and only if this median value would result in a loss, 1.5v¯(b)− b < 0.
Thus a subject that uses v¯(b) as a reference for evaluating a bid b - which seems in-
tuitively reasonable - may avoid overbidding even without taking expectations more
formally. Thus avoiding overbids provides a more reasonable benchmark for behaviour
than attaining the optimal bid of 40.
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2.2.1.2 Results
Figure 2.2a and Table 2.1 replicate the presentation of Charness and Levin (2009), the
former showing the distribution of bids and the latter presenting summary statistics
and categorizing bids as being greater than, equal to, or less than the optimal bid of
40. Figure 2.2b displays the bid distribution in terms of expected payoff. Throughout,
all payoffs are net of the endowment.
Figure 2.2: Distributions of Aggregate Bids
(a) Distribution of Bids
(b) Distribution of Bids by Expected Pay-
off
Table 2.1: Aggregate Bidding Behaviour
Source Obs Avg Bid Bid > 40 Bid 40 Bid < 40
This paper 3,300 67.9 2,772 (84.0%) 101 (3.1%) 427 (12.9%)
Charness and Levin (2009) 1,770 68.42 1,561 (88.2%) 46 (2.6%) 163 (9.2%)
The results are largely similar to those of Charness and Levin (2009), and in par-
ticular show strong evidence for the Winner’s Curse, with subjects frequently bidding
too much. The average bid of 67.9 points not only exceeds the optimal bid of 40, but
also the break-even bid of 60, and thus results in a negative expected payoff. The rates
at which subjects bid more than the optimal amount is much larger than the rate at
which they bid below it, and in each case these rates are similar to those of Charness
and Levin (2009), with a χ2 test finding no difference in the distributions presented on
the right of Table 2.1 (p = 0.1991).
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Table 2.2: Aggregate Underbidding and Overbidding
Underbids Good Bids Overbids Small Over. Large Over.
Rounds Avg Bid Avg Exp (b < 20) (b ∈ [20, 60]) (b > 60) (b ∈ (60, 90)) (b ≥ 90)
All 67.9 -2.78 166 (5.0%) 1165 (35.3%) 1969 (59.7%) 1208 (36.6%) 761 (23.1%)
First 7 68.3 -2.58 62 (3.5%) 526 (34.9%) 952 (61.6%) 718 (40.1%) 233 (21.0%)
Last 7 67.6 -2.94 93 (6.2%) 560 (37.4%) 887 (56.5%) 589 (32.1%) 298 (24.4%)
Change -1.6 -0.32 31 (2.7%) 34 (2.5%) -65 (5.2%) -129 (8.5%) 65 (3.4%)
p-value 0.442 0.015 0.004 0.160 0.013 0.000 0.005
As discussed in the previous section, I wish to focus in particular on the less demand-
ing standard of whether subjects are able to avoid overbids with negative expectation,
b > 60. Table 2.2 recategorizes bids along these lines, further splitting these overbids
into large overbids - those of at least 90 points, which result in expected losses of at
least 5.5 points - and and small overbids - those of between 60 and 90. Overbids make
up 59.7% of all bids submitted, with 23.1% large overbids. Underbids - those bids below
20, which ensure that no transaction takes place regardless of the value of the drawn
card - account for 5.0% of all bids.
This susceptibility to the Winner’s Curse is not driven by just a few badly per-
forming individuals, but rather is widespread in the individual-level data. Figure 2.3
shows the distribution of subjects by their mean expected payoff across all 15 rounds.
186 of 220 (84.5%) have negative expected payoffs overall, while 71 (32.3%) have a
mean expected payoff below -3.4, which is the figure attained by simply randomizing
uniformly over [20, 120], the range of bids that can result in a transaction. That is, the
vast majority of subjects would expect to be better off by always bidding below 20 and
ensuring they keep the endowment, while almost a third would expect to be better off
by randomizing than by casting their observed bids. A majority, 137 of 220 (62.3%),
overbid more often than not, with 34 (15.5%) overbidding in all 15 rounds. Complete
bidding behaviour is presented in Figure B.2 in Appendix B.2.
Behaviour is also highly variable on a within-subject basis, with a mean within-
subject range of 53.5 points and standard deviation of 16.5 points. The mean absolute
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Figure 2.3: Distribution of Subjects by Mean Expected Payoff
difference between a bid and the same subject’s previous bid is 11.6 points. More-
over, the changes in a subject’s bids are generally non-monotonic, with the movements
changing direction - that is, the subject increases (decreases) their bid when the last
change was to decrease (increase) it - on average 4.8 times over 15 rounds of play. A
reproduction of the Charness and Levin (2009) analysis, presented in Appendix B.2,
shows that bid adjustments are highly dependent on the subject’s gains and losses
from the previous round, with those making losses more likely to decrease their bid,
and those making gains more likely to maintain or increase it.
There is also some evidence that behaviour changes across time in a more persistent
way - that which we would call learning if it were an improvement. The second and
third rows of Table 2.2 compare aggregate behaviour from the first seven of the Auction
Game rounds (that is, the first half, rounded down to avoid and overlap) to the last
seven, with the differences in the fourth row. The final row shows p-values for two-
tailed permutation tests for each difference. These tests are described in Appendix
B.3. In particular, the rate of underbids increases from the first half to the last half
of the treatment while the rate of overbids decreases between the same periods. The
change in good bids, those between 20 and 60, is not significant. But while the overall
rate of overbids decreases, the rate of large overbids - bids of at least 90 points -
increases, while the rate of small overbids decreases. That is, while bids with negative
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expectation become less common, those that remain become larger and thus worse.
As a result, while the average bid does not change significantly, the average expected
payoff decreases (that is, the expected loss increases) over time.
Figure 2.4 shows the rate of each bid type by round, again showing the rate of
large overbids increasing while the rate of small overbids decreases. Further evidence
of behavioural changes are seen in the regressions presented in Tables 2.6 and 2.7 of
Section 2.3.
Figure 2.4: Proportion of Bids in Each Range of Net Expectation by Round
Finally, I follow Charness and Levin (2009) in adapting Eyster and Rabin (2005)
cursed equilibrium model to this game. To this end we must interpret the decision over
whether a transaction occurs as being made by a ‘seller’, who accepts the player’s bid,
b, if and only if it exceeds the card’s value, v. Given the uniform distribution of v over
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[20, 119], the seller thus accepts bid b with probability
P (accept|b) =

1 if b = 120
b−19
100
if b ∈ [20, 119]
0 if b < 20
A subject who is χ−cursed thus believes with probability χ that the seller accepts





















+ (1− χ)∑bv=20 [32v − b] if b ∈ [20, 119]
0 if b < 20
For a fully cursed subject, that is, one for which χ = 1, signifying that she always
fails to understand the relationship between v and the seller’s acceptance of the bid,
the optimal is b = 62. This is notably much closer to the mean observed bid of 67.9
than the non-cursed optimal bid, b = 40, is. Clearly, however, subjects’ failures go
beyond that which can be predicted by cursedness, with 1,935 of 3,300 bids (58.6%)
exceeding this level. Even if we follow Eyster and Rabin (2005) by allowing χ values
outside the unit interval, a numerical analysis suggests the optimal resulting bid is
bounded above by b = 70, which is lower than both 1,398 of 3,300 bids (42.4%) bids
and the average bid for 100 of 220 subjects (45.5%). For almost half of all subjects,
then, attempting to estimate a cursedness level is futile. Thus while the theoretical
basis of cursed equilibrium - that subjects fail to fully account for the informational
content of others’ information - is intuitively appealing, and its predictions differ from
the standard optimum in the right direction, it cannot account for the extent of subjects’
failures.
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2.2.2 Jury Voting Game
2.2.2.1 Design
The five jury voting games are variations on those of Guarnaschelli, McKelvey, and
Palfrey (2000), which abstract the jury voting game of Feddersen and Pesendorfer
(1998). In each round, groups of 5 players are each assigned either a red jar or a blue
jar with equal probability. The red jar contains seven red balls and three blue balls,
and the blue jar contains seven blue balls and three red balls. The group are not told
which jar has been assigned to them. Each group member is then shown an image of
the jar with the balls in random order and with all colours obscured, and clicks one of
the ten balls to reveal its colour, providing a noisy signal about the colour of the jar
which is correct with probability p = 0.7. Each subject then votes for either the red or
blue jar. If at least r group members vote for the red jar then the group selects the red
jar, otherwise the group selects the blue jar. At the end of each round, the player is
told the colour of the jar, shown the colours of the ten balls, and is told the number of
group members that voted for each jar. At the end of the session, each subject earns 25
cents for every round in which her group selected the correct jar. A player’s strategy
is denoted by σ(b) and σ(r) which give the probability that the player votes for the
red jar with blue and red signals respectively. The literature focuses on symmetric,
responsive equilibria, where the latter is defined as σ(b) 6= σ(r).3
The five variants of the game are as follows:
2.2.2.2 Human Groups with Majority Voting (HGM)
The game proceeds as above with groups of size n = 5 and majority voting, r =
3. Groups are randomly rematched each round. The unique symmetric, responsive
3This simply rules out equilibria in which each player is trivially best responding by virtue of never
being pivotal such as σ(b) = σ(r) = 1 under majority voting or σ(b) = σ(r) = 0 under any vote-rule.
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equilibrium entails (fully) informative voting, defined as σ(b) = 0, σ(r) = 1.
2.2.2.3 Human Groups with Red Unanimity Voting (HGU)
The game proceeds as above with groups of size n = 5 and a vote rule of r = 5. That
is, the group selects the red jar only if all group members vote for it, and selects the
blue jar otherwise. I refer to this as red unanimity voting. Here the unique symmetric,
responsive equilibrium is given by σ(r) = 1 and
σ(b) =
pKn,r − (1− p)








In particular, symmetric fully informative voting is no longer an equilibrium.4 This
is most easily seen by noting that when a player’s vote is pivotal, all four other group
members must have voted for the red jar. A player capable of pivotal calculus thus
infers that all four must have received red signals, which together outweigh her own
signal, inducing her to vote red regardless of its colour.
2.2.2.4 Informative Computer Groups with Red Unanimity Voting (ICG)
This game proceeds as HGU, with n = r = 5, except each group consists of one subject
and four computer players, each of which votes fully informatively, i.e. σ(b) = 0,
σ(r) = 1. Since these strategies are known to the subject, by the above pivotal reasoning
she should always vote for the red jar regardless of her signal, i.e. σ(b) = σ(r) = 1.
4If we relax the symmetry requirement, any value of σ(b) ∈ [0, 1], along with σ(r) = 1, can be a
best response to reasonable beliefs about others.
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2.2.2.5 Reverse Computer Groups with Red Unanimity Voting (RCG)
This game proceeds as ICG, with n = r = 5, except each computer player votes for
the jar that does not match its selected signal, i.e. σ(b) = 1, σ(r) = 0. Thus while
pivotality still implies four red votes, this now implies four blue signals, inducing a
subject capable of pivotal reasoning to vote for the blue jar regardless of her signal,
σ(b) = σ(r) = 0.
2.2.2.6 Option Computer Groups with Red Unanimity Voting (OCG)
This game proceeds as ICG, with n = r = 5 and computer players that vote infor-
matively, except prior to each round subjects must choose one of two options. Under
Option A, referred to here as the Information option, subjects receive a signal as above,
by selecting a ball and observing its colour, but their vote is automatically cast to match
the colour of their signal. That is, they vote informatively. Under Option B, referred
to here as the Choice option, subjects do not receive a signal, but may choose which
jar to vote for.
As computer players vote informatively, as in ICG, optimal behaviour remains to
always vote for the red jar, which can be achieved under the Choice option. That is,
this option allows subjects to vote optimally, but requires subjects to overcome the
reasonable intuition that eschewing private information is costly.
I denote the probability with which a player chooses Choice and then votes red by
σR and the probability with which she selects Choice and votes blue by σB. Thus the
probability with which she selects Information is 1− σR − σB, and optimal behaviour
is σB = 0, σR = 1.
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2.2.2.7 Order
HGM, HGU, and ICG are played in four different orders, which vary along two dimen-
sions, as summarized in Table 2.3. First, half of all subjects (Orders 1 and 2) play HGU
before ICG while the remainder play the reverse. This order impacts behaviour in each
of these two games, as discussed below and at more length in Chapter 1. Secondly, half
of all subjects (Orders 1 and 3) play HGM first, followed by HGU and ICG in some
order, while the remainder play HGM between these two games. This has no impact
on behaviour in any of these games. In each order, these are then followed by RCG and
OCG. Finally, within each of these orders, half play CL before the jury voting games
and half play it after. Again, this appears to have no impact on behaviour in any game.
Table 2.3: Treatment Orders of Jury Voting Games.
Jury Game Order n
Order 1 HGM - HGU - ICG - RCG - OCG 60
Order 2 HGU - HGM - ICG - RCG - OCG 50
Order 3 HGM - ICG - HGU - RCG - OCG 50
Order 4 ICG - HGM - HGU - RCG - OCG 60
Note: within each, half play CL before the jury voting games, and half play it after.
2.2.2.8 Results
Table 2.4: Observed (and Equilibrium) Aggregate Behaviour, Jury Voting Games
Treatments σˆ(b) σˆ(r)
HGM 0.069 (0.000) 0.948 (1.000)
HGU 0.476 (0.583) 0.912 (1.000)
ICG 0.560 (1.000) 0.919 (1.000)
RCG 0.315 (0.000) 0.613 (0.000)
σˆR σˆB
OCG 0.653 (1.000) 0.054 (0.000)
Table 2.4 summarizes the aggregate behaviour for each game. In the first four
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games, σˆ(b) and σˆ(r) show proportion of votes cast for the red jar given a blue or
red signal respectively. In OCG, σˆR is the proportion of rounds in which a subject
selects Choice and votes for the red jar, and σˆB the proportion of rounds in which
a subject selects Choice and votes for the blue jar. Individual behaviour is shown in
Figure 2.5, where each point shows one subject’s observed behaviour over the 15 rounds
played. Equilibrium and aggregate behaviour are shown by red diamonds and circles
respectively. Table 2.5 categorizes subjects by this behaviour. Each of these tables and
charts is recreated from Chapter 1.
Table 2.5: Individual Behaviour, Jury Voting Games
σˆ(r) = 1 σˆ(r) < 1
σˆ(b) = 0 σˆ(b) ∈ (0, 1) σˆ(b) = 1
HGM 167 (75.9%) 20 (9.1%) 2 (0.9%) 31 (14.1%)
HGU 49 (22.3%) 68 (30.9%) 54 (24.5%) 49 (22.3%)
ICG 47 (21.4%) 42 (19.1%) 86 (39.1%) 45 (20.5%)
σˆB = 0 σˆB > 0
σˆR = 0 σˆR ∈ (0, 1) σˆR = 1
OCG 37 (16.8%) 27 (12.3%) 117 (53.2%) 39 (17.7%)
σˆ(r) = 1 σˆ(r) = 0 Other
σˆ(b) = 1 σˆ(b) = 0 σˆ(b) = 1 σˆ(b) = 0
RCG 24 (10.9%) 26 (11.8%) 3 (1.4%) 30 (13.6%) 137 (62.3%)
The first notable aspect of the results is that subjects overwhelmingly vote infor-
matively in HGM. 75.9% never deviate from this, with 83.6% deviating at most once.
This suggests that subjects generally understand the information structure to at least
a basic level, whether or not they display evidence of pivotal thinking elsewhere. This
is further supported by the large majorities playing σˆ(r) = 1 in each of the first three
treatments - rational behaviour that is common to the sophisticated and the naive alike.
HGU and ICG provide both an opportunity for and evidence of strategic behaviour,
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Figure 2.5: Individual Behaviour by Treatment.
(a) HGM (b) HGU
(c) ICG (d) RCG
(e) OCG
with the increase in σˆ(b) relative to HGM consistent with pivotal thinking. In par-
ticular, relative to HGM, many more individuals mix when receiving a blue signal,
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σˆ(b) ∈ (0, 1), or to always vote red, σˆ(b) = 1. The latter is particularly prevalent in
ICG, in which it is the only rational strategy, whereas any σˆ(b) can be rationalized
given reasonable beliefs in HGU. In the aggregate, however, the increase in σˆ(b) falls
short of theoretical predictions in HGU, and even more so in ICG.
While not the focus of this paper, Chapter 1 considers further the relationship
between these games, and finds evidence of substantial learning in each of HGU and
ICG, with σˆ(b) increasing over time. Interestingly, learning in each of these games
appears to apply to the other, with the increase only occurring throughout the first
of the two that a subject plays, then maintaining its level (but not increasing further)
through the second. Experience in HGM does not affect either, and vice-versa. This
suggests that subjects are learning about something that the two red-unanimity games
have in common, such as pivotal thinking, as opposed to something that only applies
to one of the two games, such as changing beliefs about others’ behaviour.
OCG behaviour is largely in line with that of ICG, in which the computer players
and the resulting optimal behaviour - always voting red - are the same. Here, however,
always voting red requires subjects to first select Choice and thus to forgo private
information. 117 of 220 subjects (53.2%) always vote optimally, selecting Choice and
voting for the red jar. 37 (16.8%) always select Information and thus vote informatively.
Although 39 subjects select Choice and vote blue at least once - the behaviour with the
lowest expected payoff - they do so relatively rarely, with subjects that select Choice
then voting red 92.4% of the time. This suggests that subjects see little reason to select
Choice other than that it facilitates red votes. Overall, there is little evidence that
pivotally capable subjects struggle with the additional option presented here.
Behaviour in RCG, however, deviates substantially from previous jury voting games.
30 of 220 (13.6%) always vote blue, the optimal behaviour. This represents a substan-
tial decrease from the 86 (39.0%) that optimally always vote red in ICG. 24 (10.9%)
57
always vote red while 26 (11.8%) always vote informatively, despite neither being op-
timal any longer. RCG behaviour is thus very poor. The overwhelming difference in
subjects’ capabilities between ICG and RCG is interesting given information extrac-
tion is mathematically identical in both. One possible explanation, discussed further
in Chapter 1, is that the counterintuitive computer player behaviour in RCG confuses
subjects, or induces them to abandon sophisticated reasoning.
Cursedness can also be applied to jury voting games with unanimity voting r =
5.5 Specifically, since a cursed individual interprets others’ behaviour as being less
informative than it is, voting in equilibrium must be more informative - that is, σ(b)
decreases - in order for subjects to be willing to mix. Even symmetric fully informative
voting may be a (heavily) cursed equilibrium. Eyster and Rabin (2005) note that
aggregate support from Guarnaschelli, McKelvey, and Palfrey (2000) - the only jury
voting data at the time of publication - is weak, in that observed σˆ(b) is below the
non-cursed equilibrium level in only one of two treatments. More recent data is more
promising, however, in that the result holds in both non-majority treatments of Goeree
and Yariv (2011) and the HGU data presented here.
Estimating subjects’ cursedness appears relatively fruitless, however. The nature
of the game, in which subjects make binary decisions, means that these estimates are
necessarily coarse. In ICG, for example, it is relatively simple to show that a player
receiving a blue signal is indifferent between red and blue votes only if χ = 0.681.6 For a
subject that votes informatively, all that we can say is that χ ≥ 0.681, while for a subject
that always votes red, χ ≤ 0.681. The same applies to OCG and, with colours inverted,
to RCG. The threshold for HGU, assuming players are drawn from a large population
with the observed aggregate behaviour σˆ(r) = 0.913, σˆ(b) = 0.476, is χ = 0.171.
5In HGM, fully informative voting is optimal regardless of beliefs about others, and thus cursedness
has no bite.
6See Eyster and Rabin (2002) for the mathematical details of incorporating cursedness into the
jury voting model.
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That is, in each case, estimating cursedness simply attaches numerical labels to three
observed behaviours - always voting informatively, always voting red, and mixing - but
absent evidence that cursedness levels persists across strategic environments, it is not
clear what value these new labels provide.7
More generally, then, while the core idea of cursedness - that subjects do not fully
account for the informational content of others’ behaviour - seems a reasonable descrip-
tion of the cognitive failing that leads to naivety in jury voting games, the contribution
of the model - that it allows partial failings through the parameter χ - does not appear
especially pertinent in this environment.
2.3 Comparative Results
2.3.1 General Behaviour
The primary focus of this paper is the relationship between individuals’ bidding be-
haviour in the auction game, henceforth AG, and voting behaviour in the jury voting
games. Tables 2.6 and 2.7 show linear regressions of the expected payoff (Columns
(a) through (c)) and logistic regressions of the probability of an overbid (Columns (d)
through (f)) in AG upon various measures of behaviour in HGM, HGU, and ICG. RCG
and OCG are treated in Appendix B.4. In each case, informative voting is omitted and
thus acts as the base case.
Table 2.6 measures behaviour in terms of subjects’ observed σˆ(r) and σˆ(b). Equi-
librium in each of the three games requires σ(r) = 1, and thus we expect the same of
the observed σˆ(r). Deviations from this are necessarily irrational in HGM and ICG,
and can be explained in HGU only by implausible beliefs, such as other subjects always
7Of course, testing the persistence of χ across the two environments presented here - CL and the
jury voting games - is made impossible by the fact that most subjects’ CL behaviour is not consistent
with any χ.
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Table 2.6: Regressions of AG Behaviour on Jury Voting Frequencies
Variable Exp Payoff Overbid
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Jury HGM HGU ICG HGM HGU ICG
Constant -3.696 -4.523 -5.716 1.000 1.097 1.088
0.021 0.001 0.000 0.063 0.006 0.008
Round -0.040 -0.040 -0.040 -0.019 -0.020 -0.019
0.064 0.064 0.064 0.081 0.080 0.080
σˆ(b) -3.763 -0.384 0.242 0.064 0.145 -0.007
0.081 0.503 0.638 0.915 0.554 0.976
σˆ(r) 1.538 2.507 3.333 -0.620 -0.835 -0.715
0.344 0.105 0.017 0.257 0.061 0.118
AG First 0.077 -0.084 0.102 0.272 0.304 0.257
0.859 0.849 0.818 0.148 0.110 0.174
Obs 3,300 3,300 3,300 3,300 3,300 3,300
Notes: In all regressions standard errors are clustered by subject and p-values are presented below
the estimates.
voting against their own private information. The regressions presented here find some
evidence that such deviations correspond to worse performance in AG, with the signs
of the coefficients as expected, although this is significant at a reasonable level only for
expected payoffs in ICG (Column (c)).
σˆ(b), meanwhile, allows us to differentiate between the naive and the sophisticated,
in that positive values are consistent with sophistication but not naivety in both HGU
and ICG. This is particularly true in ICG, where σ(b) = 1 is the only rationalizable
strategy. Indeed, the estimated coefficients have the expected signs but are not signif-
icant. In HGU, where any σ(b) can be a best response to reasonable beliefs in HGU,
the effect is also insignificant in both regressions. In HGM, on the other hand, positive
values of σˆ(b) show irrational behaviour, as only informative voting is rational. Again,
the signs on the estimated coefficients are as expected, with weak significance in the
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Table 2.7: Regressions of AG Behaviour on Jury Voting Classifications
Variable Exp Payoff Overbid
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Jury HGM HGU ICG HGM HGU ICG
Constant -1.804 -1.989 -2.085 0.298 0.164 0.110
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.070 0.516 0.667
Round -0.040 -0.040 -0.040 -0.020 -0.020 -0.019
0.006 0.064 0.064 0.081 0.080 0.081
Pure Red -4.852 -0.805 -0.206 -0.142 0.266 0.224
σˆ(b) = σˆ(r) = 1 0.287 0.232 0.740 0.909 0.369 0.400
Mixed 2.994 0.262 -0.016 0.762 0.178 0.482
σˆ(b) ∈ (0, 1), σˆ(r) = 1 -2.447 0.607 0.981 0.033 0.493 0.121
Red Errors 0.003 -1.439 -1.611 0.406 0.537 0.548
σˆ(r) < 1 0.859 0.043 0.026 0.084 0.069 0.050
AG First 0.026 -0.052 0.093 0.270 0.3040 0.305
0.951 0.906 0.831 0.152 0.112 0.100
Obs 3,300 3,300 3,300 3,300 3,300 3,300
Notes: In all regressions standard errors are clustered by subject and p-values are presented below
the estimates.
first column. That is, more red votes given blue signals in HGM, where this behaviour
is irrational, relates to lower expected payoffs in AG.
Table 2.7 repeats the above but measures behaviour via dummies for the categoriza-
tions of individuals presented in Table 2.5. In each, the baseline is informative voting.
The results are qualitatively similar to the above, in that irrational deviations from
informative voting appear to have some relationship with worse performance in AG,
while rational deviations do not. In particular, the dummies for Pure Red and Mixed
voting, which help distinguish between the naive and the sophisticated in HGU and
ICG, are mostly insignificant. The one exception is in Column (d), where the coeffi-
cient on the Mixed dummy is positive and significant, suggesting higher overbid rates
in HGM. Given the only rational strategy in this game is informative voting, the Mixed
dummy shows irrational behaviour, and thus worse performance is consistent with the
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above. Likewise, the Red Errors variable, which dummies for those who vote blue with
a red signal at least once in a given treatment, is significant, or close to significant,
in five of six regressions, with the coefficients reflecting worse AG performance in each
case.
Overall, then, the results suggest that irrational deviations from informative voting
correspond to worse AG performance, while rational deviations - such as voting red
with a blue signal in HGU or ICG, which we expect of those who are capable of
hypothetical thinking - has no relationship with AG. This suggests that a basic level
of comprehension (or perhaps effort or consistency) in the jury voting games relates to
better outcomes in AG - an unsurprising result - but there is no evidence that pivotal
thinking in the former has any effect.
Finally, note that while informative voting is the baseline group in each regression,
changing this does not result in any additional significant differences between groups.
Figure 2.6 shows the distribution of bids, measured by expected (net) payoff, for each
of the HGU and ICG categories from Table 2.5, where we see again that those who vote
blue with a red signal, σˆ(b) < 1, and thus display evidence of basic misunderstandings
of the information structure of the game, are less likely to bid with positive expectation
in AG, while the differences between other groups - through which we see evidence of
pivotal thinking in the jury voting games - are less prevalent.
2.3.2 Learning and Insight
I consider next whether there is any connection between subjects’ apparent propensity
to learn in these various games. As discussed in Section 2.2, there is some evidence that
behaviour changes throughout both AG and the jury voting games. The regressions in
Tables 2.6 and 2.7 provide further support for this, with the coefficient on the round
number (weakly) significant in each. In keeping with the previous discussion, the signs
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Figure 2.6: Distributions of Net Expected Payoffs by Jury Voting Strategies
(a) By HGU Classification
(b) By ICG Classification
Notes: Informative subjects are those who play σˆ(r) = 1, σˆ(b) = 0, mixers play σˆ(r) = 1, σˆ(b) ∈ (0, 1), pure red
subjects play σˆ(r) = 1, σˆ(b) = 1, and red errors subjects play σˆ(r) < 1.
on the coefficients suggest that while overbids become less common over time, the
overall expected payoff also decreases. Again, this is because while subjects become
less likely to make overbids, those that they do make become worse on average, with
the rate of large overbids (bids of at least 90 points) increasing at the expense of smaller
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overbids.
I thus measure each subject’s long-term behavioural changes in AG by measuring
the increase in each of their mean expected payoffs and overbid rates from the first seven
rounds (that is, the first half of the rounds) to the last seven rounds. By averaging
behaviour over several rounds, I hope to account somewhat for the high short-term
variability of bids discussed above.
To measure each subject’s learning in the jury voting games I take a similar ap-
proach, taking the difference of the observed σˆ(b) between the first and last seven
rounds of each of HGU and ICG. To reflect the fact that learning in each of these
games appears to carry over to the other, as discussed in Chapter 1, I also compare the
first seven rounds of the first of these two treatments that a subject plays to the last
seven rounds of the second. Although such measures could be misleading in HGU, in
which any σˆ(b) can be a best response to reasonable beliefs about others’ behaviour, red
votes with blue signals remain the best available indicator of sophisticated behaviour.8
Table 2.8 shows linear regressions of these changes in AG behaviour - mean expected
payoff in Column (a) and overbid rate in Column (b) - on the above changes in jury
voting behaviour. Within-treatment changes in σˆ(b) do not appear to impact learning
in AG, but the change in σˆ(b) across the two treatments together does. In particular,
more learning across HGU and ICG combined - as measured by a higher increase in
σˆ(b) from the first seven rounds of the first of these treatments to the last seven rounds
of the second - results in a greater decrease (or lower increase) in the rate of overbids
from the first seven rounds of AG to the last seven.
It is also worth noting that the overbid rate increases more for subjects that play
AG before the jury voting games. Said another way, the overbid rate increases less (or
decreases more) amongst those who have already played the jury voting games. It is not
8Moreover, Chapter 1 presents evidence that in HGU informative voting, in which only σ(b) = 0
is rational, is generally a result of naivety rather than sophistication and appropriate beliefs.
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clear, however, whether this effect is due to experience playing the jury voting games
in particular, which would suggest a link between the games, or if it is simply due to
playing at the end of an experimental session rather than the beginning. Equivalent
regressions presented in Chapter 1 show that behaviour in the jury voting games is
unaffected by whether or not subjects have first played AG.
Table 2.8: Regressions of AG learning on changes in jury voting behaviour.




∆σˆ(b), HGU -0.697 -0.022
0.275 0.760
∆σˆ(b), ICG -1.139 0.100
0.214 0.326
∆σˆ(b), Overall 0.389 0.108
0.397 0.053
AG First 0.066 0.095
0.870 0.043
Obs 220 220
Notes: In all regressions standard errors are clustered by subject and p-values are presented
below the estimates.
The question arises, then, as to whether any changes in jury voting behaviour carry
over to AG, as they presumably would if they were driven by insights relevant to both
games. In particular, if that which is learned in the jury voting games is applicable to
AG then we would expect those who learn more in the former to then perform better
in the latter when playing it afterwards. Table 2.9 thus restricts to those who play the
jury voting games before AG and regresses the two measures of overall AG performance
- that is, the levels rather than the changes over time - upon the previous measures of
learning in the jury voting games. There is no evidence that learning in the jury voting
games carries over, however, as none of the coefficients are significant.
65





∆σˆ(b), HGU -0.262 0.084
0.850 0.880
∆σˆ(b), ICG -0.427 0.471
0.783 0.388
∆σˆ(b), Overall 0.897 -0.359
0.222 0.303
Obs 1650 1650
Notes: In all regressions standard errors are
clustered by subject and p-values are presented below the estimates.
2.4 Conclusions
It is often assumed that sophistication in jury voting games and resilience to the Win-
ner’s Curse are related, due to both relying on the ability to condition on, and extract
information from, hypothetical events. The experiment presented here shows little ev-
idence for this, however. While those who deviate from informative voting in jury
voting games in irrational ways tend to do worse in AG - overbidding more and achiev-
ing lower expected payoffs - there is no difference for those who deviate in ways that
suggest hypothetical thinking, whether measured directly by raw strategy values or by
categorization of subjects.
There is some evidence that those whose behaviour changes more in the jury voting
games also improve more in AG, but it is not clear whether this is due to developing
insights into hypothetical thinking, or to simply due to a more ready response to gains
and losses. Regardless, those who learn more in the jury voting games do not appear
to then play better in AG, suggesting that this learning does not translate between
games.
Thus while the games are clearly bound in theory by the potential for inference
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from hypothetical events, there remains no evidence of a relationship in practice.
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Chapter 3
Stochastic Choice in Games: an
Experiment
68
This chapter is co-authored with Evan Friedman.
3.1 Introduction
Game theory rests on Nash equilibrium (NE) as its central concept, but despite its
appeal and influence, it fails to capture the richness of experimental data. Systematic
deviations from NE predictions have been documented, even in some of the simplest
games.
NE rests on two assumptions. First, players form accurate beliefs over the distri-
bution of opponents’ actions. Second, players best respond to these beliefs. Efforts to
reconcile theory with data typically amount to weakenings of these strict assumptions.
One leading example is quantal response equilibrium (QRE) (McKelvey and Palfrey
(1995)), which is very much like NE, but relaxes the assumption of best response. That
is, each player forms correct beliefs over the distribution of opponents’ actions, and
though he tends to take better actions (by expected utility), he fails to do so with
probability one. Simply put, QRE is an equilibrium model with “noise in actions”.
However, recent work by Friedman (2018) introduces noisy belief equilibrium (NBE),
an equilibrium model with “noise in beliefs” that maintains best response, and shows
that it can explain several of the same phenomena as QRE. Specifically, when only
considering actions data, the two models make similar predictions in many games com-
monly played in the lab.
The primitive of QRE is the quantal response function–the mapping from payoffs
(given beliefs) to actions. The primitive of NBE is the noisy belief mapping—the map-
ping from opponents’ actions to beliefs. In order for these theories to have empirical
content, these primitives are restricted to satisfy several behavioral axioms which cap-
ture what is meant by noisy actions and noisy beliefs.
The axioms capture forms of bounded rationality. For QRE, better actions are
69
played with higher probability, and an all-else-equal increase in the payoff to some
action increases the probability it is played. For NBE, belief distributions are unbiased
and shift around in the same direction as changes in the opponents’ actions.
Since QRE and NBE incorporate noisy actions and noisy beliefs, respectively–the
two fundamental sources of stochasticity in games–it is natural to distinguish these
models in data. One approach would be to design games in which the models’ pre-
dictions diverge and then collect standard actions data. However, since it is obvious
that both sources of noise will be present in almost any experimental dataset, we take
a different approach.
We run a laboratory experiment in which we augment standard actions data with
elicited (and incentivized) beliefs; and by playing a series of games with systematically
varied payoffs, we “trace out” the mappings from the opponent’s actions to beliefs and
from payoffs (given beliefs) to actions. These correspond to the primitives of NBE and
QRE, respectively. With these empirical primitives, we test the axioms. We emphasize
that the games we play do not allow for a strong separation of the theories in terms of
predictions, but by collecting beliefs data, we test the assumptions underlying them.
Understanding the extent to which these axioms fail will help to discipline modelling
assumptions and, we argue, be of reduced-form general interest independent of the
models.
Our experiment has two parts. In the first part, subjects play a set of fully mixed
2× 2 games without feedback. In the second part, subjects state their beliefs and take
actions for these games. The games are the same up to a single payoff parameter for
player 1, and by varying this parameter, we generate the desired variation in beliefs
and expected payoffs for both players. Player 2’s payoff parameters remain fixed across
games, and so there is an asymmetry in player roles which we explore.
We find that (i) belief distributions tend to shift in the same direction as changes in
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opponents’ actions, (ii) beliefs are systematically biased–“conservative” for one player
1 and “extreme” for player 2, (iii) rates of best response vary systematically across
games, and (iv) systematic failures to maximize expected payoffs (given beliefs) are well
explained by risk aversion despite our efforts to mitigate it in the experiment. Digging
deeper into the process of belief formation, we collect subject-level measures of strategic
sophistication based on dominance solvable games. We find that (v) experience as
player 1 causes higher levels of sophistication than player 2 despite playing exactly
the same games, (vi) sophistication measured in dominance solvable games strongly
predicts behavior in fully mixed games, and (vii) belief elicitation significantly effects
actions in a direction consistent with increasing sophistication.
3.2 Theoretical Background
Though defined for any normal form game, we provide the definitions of QRE and
NBE for 2 × 2 games with unique, mixed strategy Nash equilibria.1 These games,
sometimes referred to as “generalized matching pennies” or simply “matching pennies”,
are frequently played in experiments and form the basis of this experiment.
Matching pennies is defined by the payoff matrix in Figure 3.1.2 The parameters
aL, aR, bU , and bD give the base payoffs. The parameters cL, cR, dU , and dD are the payoff
differences, which we assume are strictly positive to maintain the relevant features.3 The
row player’s actions are U and D (“up” and “down”); the column player’s actions are
L and R (“left” and “right”).
1Friedman (2018) defines NBE for normal form games. The fully mixed 2× 2 case obscures some
of its general properties. For example, NBE is a refinement of rationalizability (Bernheim (1984) and
Pearce (1984)) in the sense that only rationalizable actions are played with positive probability in
equilibrium.
2This notation is borrowed from Selten and Chmura (2008) with slight modification.





bU bU + dU U: up D: down
L: left R: right
Player 1’s payoff in lower-left corner
aL + cL aR Player 2’s payoff in upper-right corner
D
bD + dD bD
aL, aR, bU , bD ∈ R
cL, cR, dU , dD > 0
aL aR + cR
Figure 3.1: Matching Pennies
We use i and j as player indices. In particular, we always refer to player i as forming
beliefs about the behavior of opponent j. Reserving k and l for action indices, we write,
for example, aik as action k of player i. To minimize the use of subscripts, we use p
and q for the probabilities of playing U and L, respectively, which we refer to simply
as “actions”. We use r ∈ [0, 1] to refer to the action of player j, which should be
understood as p or q depending on context.





}, which depends only on the payoff differences. The predictions of other
concepts may depend on more features of the game (as well as exogenously specified
primitives from outside the game).
3.2.1 Quantal Response Equilibrium
In a QRE, a player’s behavior depends on the expected payoffs to each action. To






)) ∈ R2 be the vector of i’s (subjective) expected
utilities given belief r
′ ∈ [0, 1] over the behavior of player j. We use vi = (vi1, vi2) ∈ R2
as shorthand for an arbitrary vector of expected utilities. That is, vi is understood to
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satisfy vi = u¯i(r
′
) for some r
′
.
In a QRE, player i’s quantal response function Qi = (Qi1, Qi2) : R2 → [0, 1]2 maps
his vector of expected utilities to a distribution over actions. The quantal response
function is the primitive and assumed to satisfy the following regularity axioms (Goeree
et al. (2005)):
(A1) Interiority: Qik(vi) ∈ (0, 1) for all k ∈ 1, 2 and for all vi ∈ R2.
(A2) Continuity: Qik(vi) is a continuous and differentiable function for all vi ∈ R2.
(A3) Responsiveness: ∂Qik(vi)
∂vik
> 0 for all k ∈ 1, 2 and vi ∈ RJ(i).
(A4) Monotonicity: vik > vil =⇒ Qik(vi) > Qil(vi).
Axioms (A1)-(A2) are technical. Behavioral axioms (A3)-(A4) require that an all-
else-equal increase in the payoff to some action increases the probability it is played
and that higher payoff actions are played with higher probability.
To close the model, it is assumed that each player has correct beliefs over the
distribution of the opponent’s actions and that actions are consistent with the quantal
response functions. Specializing notation in the obvious way by letting QU and QL be
quantal responses and u¯U , u¯D, u¯L, and u¯R be expected utilities to actions:
Definition 1. A QRE is any (p, q) ∈ [0, 1]2 such that p = QU(u¯U(q), u¯D(q)) and
q = QL(u¯L(p), u¯R(p)).
3.2.2 Noisy Belief Equilibrium
In an NBE (Friedman (2018)), players’ beliefs are drawn from distributions that depend
on the opponents’ equilibrium behavior. If QRE adds “noise to actions”, NBE adds
“noise to beliefs”.4
4For similar approaches of injecting noise into equilibrium beliefs, see Friedman and Mezzetti
(2005) from which NBE adopts the basic idea of belief mappings and Rubinstein and Osborne (2003)
which assumes that players are frequentists whose beliefs are formed from observing random samples
73
Given player j’s action r ∈ [0, 1], we assume that player i’s belief over j’s action is
drawn from a distribution that depends on r. In other words, player i’s belief over j’s
action is a random variable that we denote r∗(r), which depends on r and is supported
on [0, 1]. We call this family of random variables noisy beliefs, and they are defined
by a family of CDFs: for any potential belief r¯ ∈ [0, 1], F i(r¯|r) is the probability of
realizing a belief less than or equal to r¯ given that player j is playing r. Noisy beliefs
are assumed to satisfy the following axioms:
(B1) Interior full support: For any r ∈ (0, 1), F i(r¯|r) is strictly increasing and
continuous in r¯ ∈ [0, 1]; r∗(0) = 0 and r∗(1) = 1 with probability 1.
(B2) Continuity: For any r¯ ∈ (0, 1), F i(r¯|r) is continuous in r ∈ [0, 1].
(B3) Responsiveness: For all r < r
′ ∈ [0, 1], F i(r¯|r′) ≤ F i(r¯|r) for r¯ ∈ [0, 1] and
F i(r¯|r′) < F i(r¯|r) for r¯ ∈ (0, 1).
(B4) Unbiasedness: F i(r|r) = 1
2
for r ∈ (0, 1).
Axioms (B1)-(B2) are technical. Behavioral axioms (B3)-(B4) require that beliefs
shift up in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance when the opponent’s action
frequency increases and that beliefs are unbiased on median.5
To close the model, it is assumed that players best respond to realized beliefs and
that belief distributions depend on the opponent’s expected action. To this end, we
define reaction functions which give the probabilities with which U (for player 1) and
L (for player 2) are best responses to realized beliefs:
ΨU(q) ≡1− F 1(qNE|q)
ΨL(p) ≡F 2(pNE|p).
of their opponents’ equilibrium behavior.
5Friedman (2018) discusses microfoundations and explores alternate notions such as unbiasedness
on mean, which is compatible with (B1)-(B4) and so could be imposed in addition.
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These reactions depend on game’s payoffs only through the Nash equilibrium, as this
defines the cutoff beliefs that make players indifferent.
Definition 2. An NBE is any (p, q) ∈ [0, 1]2 such that ΨU(q) = p and ΨL(p) = q.
3.3 Experimental Design
3.3.1 Overall Structure
The experiment consists of two treatments, summarized in table 3.1. The final design
was determined after running two types of pilot sessions, which are not discussed here.6
Our sessions were run in the Columbia Experimental Laboratory in the Social Sciences
(CELSS). Subjects were mainly undergraduate students at Columbia and Barnard Col-
leges.
Treatment Player 1-subjects Player 2-subjects Total
A-BA 54 56 110
A-A 11 11 22
Table 3.1: Overview of experiment
The main treatment is A-BA, which we describe here. The treatment A-A is similar,
but does not involve belief elicitation; it is included to test whether belief elicitation
itself has an effect on behavior, and we defer its discussion to Section 3.8. For aggregate
tests using actions data, we pool together the first sections of A-A and A-BA since that
data was collected under identical conditions.
The experiment involves 2×2 matrix games, and at the beginning of the experiment,
subjects are divided into two equal-sized subpopulations of row and column players,
which we refer to as players 1 and 2, respectively. The A-BA treatment consists of two
6We feared the first type was too long, and the second type did not collect a type of data that
we wished to analyze. To the extent these sessions overlap with our final design, the results are very
similar.
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sections, “action” (A) and “belief-action” (BA). In each of the 20 rounds of Section
A, players are anonymously and randomly paired and take actions simultaneously. In
each of the 40 rounds of Section BA, subjects are presented with a payoff matrix that
appeared in A. Then, before taking an action, they state a belief about their opponent’s
behavior. The BA-belief is over actions taken by subjects in A and the BA-action is
paired against an action taken in A. In this way, BA-subjects form beliefs about and
play against A-subjects. Subjects in BA are not paired since they are playing against
subjects in A, and so are allowed to play at their own pace, though in both sections
subjects must wait for 10 seconds before submitting their answers. Screenshots of the
experimental interface are given in Appendix C.4.
Before the start of Section A, instructions (see Appendix C.1) were read aloud
accompanied by slides (see Appendix C.2). These instructions describe the strategic
interaction and teach subjects how to understand 2× 2 payoff matrices. Subjects then
answered 4 questions to demonstrate their understanding of how to map players’ actions
in a game to payoff outcomes. All subjects were required to answer these correctly.
Subjects then played 4 unpaid practice rounds before proceeding to Section A. After
Section A, additional instructions for Section BA were given. Only at that point were
subjects introduced to the notion of a belief and the elicitation mechanism described.
Subjects then played 3 unpaid practice rounds before proceeding to Section BA.
At no point during the experiment (including the unpaid practice rounds) were
subjects provided any feedback. In particular, no feedback was provided about other
subjects’ actions, the outcomes of games, or the accuracy of belief statements. Only
at the end of the experiment did subjects learn about the outcomes of the games and
belief elicitations that were selected for payment. This simplifies the analysis because
subjects cannot condition on the history of play. It is also conceptually important as
we are interested in observing stochasticity in beliefs, not changes in beliefs that are
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due to new information.
Each game is played mutliple times. This is necessary because we wish to analyze
patterns in individual subjects’ belief data. However, we take several measures to
approximate a situation in which each game is seen as if for the first time. First,
there is no feedback as described. Second, there is a large “cross section”, i.e. more
distinct games than the number of times each game is played. Third, the games appear
in a random order subject to the same game not appearing more than once within 3
consecutive rounds.
Subjects were paid according to one randomly selected round (based on actions)
from A, and four randomly selected rounds from BA–two rounds based on actions
and two rounds based on beliefs.7 Since there are twice as many rounds in BA as in
A, this equates the incentives for taking actions across sections. Each unit of payoff
corresponded to a probability point of earning $10 (e.g. 20 is a lottery that pays $10
with probability 20% and $0 otherwise). This is to mitigate the effects of risk aversion
as expected utility is linear in probability points.8
3.3.2 The Games
Central to our design are the games whose payoffs are in Table 3.2, indexed by different
values of X > 0. As shorthand, we refer to the game X = 80 as “X80” and similarly
for different values of X.
These games have several important features. First, they are fully mixed, so we
would not expect there to be much no-feedback learning (e.g. Weber (2003)). Second,
they are of low dimension in the sense that each player’s beliefs are one-dimensional.
7To allay any hedging concerns, all five payments were based on different matrices and this was
emphasized to subjects.
8Evidence suggests that this only partially linearizes payoffs in the sense that people still behave as
if they have a utility function over probability points with some curvature. See for example, Harrison
et al. (2013).
77







Table 3.2: Game X
This is of obvious practical importance for eliciting beliefs, and means that it is feasible
to “tile” the space of possible beliefs (the unit interval) with relatively few games (i.e.
we avoid the curse of dimensionality). Third, they are sparse in the sense that the
base payoffs are set to 0. Such a restriction has no impact on equilibria but makes the
game’s structure more transparent and makes it easier to calculate best responses and
perceive differences across games. Fourth, by varying X, the theories under scrutiny
predict systematic variation in actions and beliefs, as we now show.
By varying X, we vary the ratio of payoff differences, and hence the equilibria.
Using p and q to denote predicted probabilities of U (for player 1) and L (for player
2), respectively, the NE predictions are qNE =
20
X+20
and pNE = 0.5 (constant for all
X). As is well-known, NE predicts each player must mix to make the other player
indifferent, and this is why pNE = 0.5 for all X.
For any fixed X > 0, both QRE and NBE give the same set predictions (i.e. that
can be achieved for some primitive satisfying the axioms); and these feature systematic
deviations from the NE, with the NE prediction at an extreme point of the set. Fur-
thermore, whereas NE predicts that p is unaffected by changes in X, both QRE and
NBE make the prediction that p increases in X. We are interested in these predictions
for different values of X, but since qNE is a strictly decreasing function of X, we can
parameterize predictions by qNE directly as in Figure 3.2 and summarized Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. In game X:
(i) pNBE, pQRE ∈ (12 , 1) for qNE < 12 ; pNBE, pQRE ∈ (0, 12) for qNE > 12 .
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Figure 3.2: Equilibrium Predictions for Game X as a function of qNE
The left panel plots values of p predicted by NE and QRE/NBE. The right panel plots values of q
predicted by NE and QRE/NBE. All QRE/NBE must fall within the gray regions, and QRE/NBE
predict that p decreases in qNE and q increases in qNE . The red lines correspond to logit QRE for
some fixed λ, and the blue lines correspond to a particular parametrization of NBE.
(ii) qNBE, qQRE ∈ (qNE, 12) for qNE < 12 ; qNBE, qQRE ∈ (12 , qNE) for qNE > 12 .
(iii) pNBE, pQRE are strictly decreasing in qNE ∈ (0, 1).
(iv) qNBE, qQRE are strictly increasing in qNE ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. See Appendix C.3.
Parts (i)-(ii) of the lemma say that for any one game, the QRE and NBE predic-
tions systematically deviate from the NE prediction. Visually, the QRE/NBE predic-
tions must fall in the gray regions of Figure 3.2. Parts (iii)-(iv) of the lemma give
comparative static predictions as model primitives (quantal response function or noisy
belief mapping) are held fixed as the game varies. This suggests that, by varying X,
we may observe the desired variation in beliefs and payoffs.9
9Such a comparative static represents an example of the “own payoff effect” (see, for example,
Ochs (1995) and Goeree et al. (2003)).
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This holds whenever the noisy beliefs satisfy a condition called label invariance.10 On
the other hand, the QRE will not be symmetric if the quantal response function is
translation invariant11 and label invariant12, properties that holds for the common
logit QRE (red line) and more generally for any structural QRE.13
Lemma 2. In game X:




(ii) If QRE is translation invariant and label invariant, qQRE and pQRE are not




Proof. See Appendix C.3.
For the experiment, we choose the six values of X given in Table 3.3. We choose
values so that, by Lemma 2, label invariant NBE predicts symmetry about X = 20
(qNE = 0.5). This allows for a basic benchmark prediction to which we can compare
deviations.14 We represent the selection of X-games with vertical lines in Figure 3.2
(labelled along the top axis).
In addition to the X-games, we also play the games given in Table 3.4. X80s (“s”
for “scale”) is the same as X80, except with all payoffs divided by 10. This is included
10r∗ is label invariant if the distribution of r∗(r) is the same as the distribution of 1 − r∗(1 − r).
Equivalently, r∗ is label invariant if F i(r¯|r) = 1− F i(1− r¯|1− r) for all r¯, r ∈ [0, 1].
11Qi is translation invariant if Qi(vi) = Qi(vi + γeJ(i)) for all γ ∈ R where eJ(i) = (1, ..., 1) is the
vector of ones.
12Qi is label invariant if, for all j and k, Qij(vi) = Qik(v
′
i) if vij = v
′






13A structural quantal response function is derived by applying additive errors to the expected
utilities. Goeree et al. (2005) show that structural quantal response functions are translation invariant.
14Based on our pilot in which we played X20, we take as given that behavior would be essentially
uniform and that nearly all belief statements would indicate uniform play, so we omit X20 in our final
design.
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X 80 40 10 5 2 1
qNE 0.2 0.333 0.667 0.8 0.909 0.952
pNE 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Table 3.3: Selection of X-games
as both QRE and NBE give very precise predictions on the effects of scaling payoffs
(Friedman (2018)). T1 and T2 are “target” games, both of which are similar to X5,
except the symmetry of player 2’s payoffs have been broken. These are included to
test the robustness of the estimated noisy beliefs: can we predict behavior in these
games using beliefs elicited in the X-games? D1 is dominance solvable: player 1 has a
dominant action to which player 2 has a unique best response; player 2’s other action
is a best response to uniform play. D2 is the same up to changing player roles and
relabelling actions, i.e. it is player 2 with the dominant action. These games are
included as measures of attention (i.e. do you believe your opponent will take his strictly
dominant action?) and strategic sophistication (i.e. do you believe your opponent will
best respond to your strictly dominant action?)
Table 3.5 summarizes the games played in both sections and the number of rounds
for each.
3.3.3 Eliciting Beliefs Using Random Binary Choice
We used the random binary choice (RBC) mechanism (see, for example, Karni (2009))
to incentivize subjects to state their beliefs accurately. In an RBC, subjects are asked
which they prefer from a list of 101 binary choices, as in Table 3.6 with option A on the
left and option B on the right. If a subject holds belief b% over the probability an event
E occurs and his preferences respect stochastic dominance (in particular, they do not
have to be risk-neutral), it is optimal to choose option A for questions numbered less
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Table 3.4: Additional Games
Section Games Rounds of each Rounds
A




X1, X2, X5, X10, X40, X80; X80s 5
40Di 3
Dj 2
Table 3.5: Games by Section
than b and option B for questions numbered greater than b.15 Otherwise, the subject is
failing to choose the option that he believes gives the highest probability of receiving
the prize.
In Section BA of the experiment, the event E is that a randomly selected player
chose a particular action. Specifically, subjects were shown a matrix that appeared in
15Another popular method for incentivizing beliefs is the quadratic scoring rule (see, for example,
Nyarko and Schotter (2002)), which has advantages but requires risk neutrality for incentive compat-
ibility. Schotter and Trevino (2014) reviews these and other elicitation mechanisms.
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Would you rather have:
Option A: Option B:
Q.0 $5 if the event E occurs or $5 with probability 0%
Q.1 $5 if the event E occurs or $5 with probability 1%
Q.2 $5 if the event E occurs or $5 with probability 2%
...
...
Q.99 $5 if the event E occurs or $5 with probability 99%
Q.100 $5 if the event E occurs or $5 with probability 100%
Table 3.6: Random Binary Choice
Section A and told that “The computer has randomly selected a round of Section 1 in
which the matrix below was played.” Player 1 (blue) subjects were then asked “What
do you believe is the probability that a randomly selected red player chose L in that
round?”, and similarly for player 2 (red) subjects. By entering their belief, a whole
number between 0 and 100 inclusive, the rows of the table were filled out optimally
given the stated belief (indifference broken in favor of option B).
If a round is selected for a belief payment, one of the 101 rows is randomly chosen
and subjects receive their chosen option. If the subject chose option A in the selected
row, a subject of the relevant type is selected and he receives $5 if he chose the relevant
option. If he chose option B in the selected row, he receives $5 with the probability
given. Since each row is chosen for payment with positive probability, subjects are
incentivized to state their beliefs accurately. In addition, subjects are told explicitly
that it is in their best interest to state their beliefs accurately.
3.4 Overview of the Data
We begin with a holistic view of the data. In Figure 3.3, we reproduce Figure 3.2
superimposed with individual belief data and various aggregate measures. The first
panel plots player 1’s action data as well as player 2’s beliefs about player 1. Specifically,
we plot (1) pA: player 1’s action frequency from Section A; (2) pBA: player 1’s action
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frequency from Section BA; (3) pbr: the action frequency that player 1 would have if
he were to have best responded to all belief statements in BA; and (4) med(p∗): the
median of player 2’s beliefs about player 1. The second panel is the analogue for player
2.
For player 1, we find that the empirical action frequencies pA and pBA are inconsis-
tent with theory in several games and do not match the comparative static predictions
in X, which are non-monotonic. For player 2, we find that the empirical action fre-
quencies qA and qBA are consistent with theory in most but not all games, and the
comparative static in X holds. Interestingly, the median beliefs are consistent with
NBE: if the action frequencies matched the median beliefs, they would be consistent
with NBE.
The aggregate data hides considerable subject-level heterogeneity. In Figures C.8
and C.9 of Appendix C.5.1, we give some representative individual subject plots. Over-
whelmingly, an individual subject’s beliefs for a given game are distributed around
a central tendency that varies sytematically across games, though the dependence of
beliefs on game varies considerably across subjects. That the individual subject be-
lief distributions vary so systematically across games suggests that the beliefs data are
meaningful.
Finally, by comparing pA to pBA and qA to qBA, there are systematic differences in
action frequencies across the two sections of the experiment, with the “direction” of
the difference being uniform across all games for both players. In Section 3.8, we argue
that these differences are caused by the belief elicitation itself.
3.5 Testing the Axioms
We test the axioms of model primitives–the quantal response function in the case of
QRE and noisy beliefs in the case of NBE. In testing QRE’s axioms, we take belief
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Figure 3.3: Equilibrium predictions for game X as a function of qNE
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statements as given and must associate individual beliefs with actions, and hence we
use data from Section BA. In testing NBE’s axioms, we must compare the belief data
from Section BA with the actions from Section A (recall that beliefs were elicited about
subjects’ behavior in A).
3.5.1 QRE
A weak implication of monotonicity in binary action games is that best responses will
be taken with probability greater than one-half. Tables 3.7 and 3.8 show that best
responses are taken with probability greater than one-half in all games, though in not
all cases is this significant.
Unsurprisingly, player 2’s rates of best response are uniformly higher than those of
player 1. By construction, for any given belief other than p∗ = 1
2
, one of player 2’s
actions stochastically dominates the other, and hence should be taken by all subjects
who do not tremble, independent of risk attitude. Perhaps the lower rates of best
response for player 1 are due to the relative complexity of “calculating” the utility to
each action. Another possibility is misspecification in assuming risk neutrality, and
perhaps by allowing curvature the two players would have similar rates.
Two interesting facts emerge from the best response rates. First, player 1’s best
response rates are uniformly higher for games X > 20 than for X < 20. Second, player
2’s best response rates are essentially constant across games. This is despite the fact
that the belief distributions vary systematically across games.
To test monotonicity fully requires that we estimate the probability of best response
conditional on all realized beliefs. To this end, we estimate for each game the action
frequencies predicted by beliefs, which we plot in Figure 3.4. It is important that the
relationship is kept flexible, so we fit linear splines (see figure caption for details).
Monotonicity is satisfied if and only if the action with the highest payoff is played
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
X80 X40 X10 X5 X2 X1 all
best response rate 0.741∗∗∗ 0.737∗∗∗ 0.667∗∗∗ 0.600∗∗ 0.544 0.544 0.639∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.026) (0.356) (0.414) (0.000)
Observations 270 270 270 270 270 270 1620
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table 3.7: Player 1’s Rates of Best Response
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
X80 X40 X10 X5 X2 X1 all
best response rate 0.836∗∗∗ 0.857∗∗∗ 0.854∗∗∗ 0.836∗∗∗ 0.854∗∗∗ 0.857∗∗∗ 0.849∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 280 280 280 280 280 280 1680
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table 3.8: Player 2’s rates of best response
with probability greater than one-half. Accordingly, in each panel, we plot the “indif-
ferent belief” as a vertical line. Monotonicity is satisfied for player 1 (player 2) if and
only if the action frequency is weakly less than (greater than) one-half for beliefs lower
than the indifferent belief and weakly greater than (less than) one-half for beliefs higher
than the indifferent belief.
We find that monotonicity cannot be rejected in all games for player 2, but is
rejected for all games of player 1. In particular, monotonicity is violated over a range
of roughly one-fifth of possible beliefs. The nature of violations is systematic. For
X > 20, the violations are for beliefs just “right of” indifference, and for X < 20, the
violations are just “left of” indifference. Such a pattern is consistent qualitatively with
risk aversion or some desire to minimize the probability of receiving the low payoff of
zero or equivalently maximize the probability of “winning”.
Responsiveness is satisfied if and only if the predicted action frequences are in-
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Figure 3.4: Action frequencies predicted by beliefs
Using a linear spline with 4 knots (determined by belief quintiles), we plot the action frequncies
predicted by beliefs. Standard errors are clustered by subject. The left panels are for player 1 and
the right panels are for player 2. The vertical dashed line gives the “indifferent belief” and the
horizontal line is set to one-half.
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creasing in beliefs for player 1 and decreasing in beliefs for player 2. We say that
repsonsiveness is rejected if the slope of one of the line segments in the estimated
spline is significantly negative for player 1 and significantly positive for player 2. We
cannot reject responsiveness in X40 and X5 for player 1 and X40 for player 2, but we
do reject it in all other cases. That responsiveness is rejected in the majority of games
is both surprising and difficult to explain.
3.5.2 NBE
The NBE axiom unbiasedness requires that beliefs are correct on median. Tables 3.9
and 3.10 report the bias of beliefs for each game that are formed about player 1 and
player 2, respectively. To determine significance, we bootstrap confidence intervals for
the difference between median belief and (mean) action frequency and estimate the two-
sided (1−x)%-confidence interval16. We report the smallest x such that this confidence
interval excludes 0, which is conceptually similar to a p-value of the hypothesis of
unbiasedness. In Appendix C.5, we report similar tables based on the mean of beliefs.
We find that player 1’s beliefs about player 2 are remarkably accurate in that we
fail to reject unbiasedness in four of six games individually. What is more, significant
or not, the direction of bias is not systematic. When using the mean belief instead
of median (Appendix C.5), we again find that we cannot reject unbiasedness in most
games individually. However, based on the mean, the direction of bias is “conservative”
in the sense that mean beliefs are more uniform that the actual distribution of actions.
Such bias has been documented by Huck and Weizsacker (2002) in other settings, and
is relatively common in experiments in which beliefs are elicited.
16To preserve the within-subject correlation structure, each bootstrap sample is generated as follows.
For beliefs, we re-sample (with replacement) A-BA subjects, and conditional on drawing a subject,
we re-sample from his belief data (with replacement). Independently, for actions, we re-sample (with
replacement) the pooled A-BA and A-A subjects, and conditional on drawing a subject, we re-sample
his action data from the first section.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
X80 X40 X10 X5 X2 X1
beliefs - actions 30.000∗∗∗ 28.259∗∗∗ -18.852∗∗∗ -21.667∗∗∗ -34.444∗∗∗ -26.111∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 410 410 410 410 410 410
Bootstrapped ”p-values” in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table 3.9: Player 2’s beliefs versus player 1’s actions
We report the difference between the median belief and the action frequency for each game. We
bootstrap this difference and estimate the two-sided (1− x)%-confidence interval. We report the
smallest x such that this confidence interval excludes 0, which is similar to a p-value.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
X80 X40 X10 X5 X2 X1
beliefs - actions -3.134 7.127∗ -0.672 -7.612 -4.627 -0.627
(0.232) (0.065) (0.433) (0.156) (0.164) (0.457)
Observations 404 404 404 404 404 404
Boostrapped ”p-values” in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table 3.10: Player 1’s beliefs versus player 2’s actions
We report the difference between the median belief and the action frequency for each game. We
bootstrap this difference and estimate the two-sided (1− x)%-confidence interval. We report the
smallest x such that this confidence interval excludes 0, which is similar to a p-value.
More interestingly, we find that player 2’s beliefs about player 1 are very “ex-
treme” and we reject unbiasedness for all games (and similarly for mean-unbiasedness).
Whereas player 1’s actions are relatively close to uniform for all values of X, we see
that player 2’s beliefs are too high when X > 20 and too low when X < 20.
We plot the empirical distributions of beliefs by player and game in Figure 3.5. We
see that, as X varies, the distributions appear to shift monotonically in X in the sense
of FOSD, and this is confirmed by Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests in Table 3.11 (only for
player 2’s beliefs across X2 and X1 is the difference not significant at conventional
levels). Since the empirical distribution of actions does not change monotonically in
X in the same direction as the beliefs, this implies that the beliefs distributions fail
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Table 3.11: Relationship between belief distributions.
We report Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics of the hypothesis that distributions of beliefs across pairs
of games are not ordered by FOSD. p-values are reported in parenthesis.
responsiveness. Interestingly, however, the belief distributions do move with X as
predicted by the theory even though the actions do not.
3.6 Scale Invariance
How does equilibium behavior vary with changes in payoff magnitude or scale? Fried-
man (2018) shows that NBE is invariant to changes in scale, whereas translation in-
variant regular QRE (a large axiomatic class that includes structural QRE with i.i.d.
errors such as logit) is sensitive to scale.
To answer this question, we compare behavior in X80 to that in X80s. The latter
is the same as the former, except with all payoffs divided by 10. A t-test shows that
we cannot reject that both games have the same average frequency of actions for both
players, as reported in Table 3.12. This is consistent with the study by McKelvey et al.
(2000) on payoff magnitude, though unlike their design, ours does not involve feedback
and features a larger scaling factor (10 as opposed to 4).
What about beliefs? Plotting the belief distributions in Figure 3.6 shows that the
belief distributions are slightly more uniform in X80s than in X80, with a central
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Figure 3.5: Belief Distributions
The left panel is for player 2’s beliefs about player 1, and the right panel is for player 1’s beliefs
about player 2. The solid lines mark the mean of i’s beliefs and the dashed line marks the empirical










∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table 3.12: Scale invariance in actions
We report t-tests of the differences between action frequencies of X80 and X80s.
Standard errors are clustered by subject.
Figure 3.6: Belief distributions across scaled games
The solid colors give beliefs in X80, and the black outline gives beliefs in X80s. The left panel is
player 2’s beliefs about player 1, and the right panel gives player 1’s beliefs about player 2.
tendency slightly closer to one-half. Though the effect seems small, it is statistically
significant, as shown in Table 3.13. This suggests that subjects believe that others are
more random when the stakes are low. That beliefs change (albeit slightly) with scale
but actions do not poses a minor puzzle.
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Table 3.13: Scale invariance in beliefs
We report Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics of the hypothesis that distributions of beliefs are not
ordered by FOSD. p-values are reported in parenthesis.
3.7 Sophistication
In experimental studies of strategic sophistication, it is typical to play games that
are dominance solvable. Commonly played games are the beauty contest game (e.g.
Nagel (1995)), 11-20 game (e.g. Alaoui and Penta (2015)), or 3× 3 dominance solvable
games (e.g. Costa-Gomes and Weizsacker (2008)). This is because the framework
of level k typically assigns a unique level to each action except those that are part
of the Nash equilibrium profile, which are consistent with all levels above a certain
threshold. Therefore, it is easy to infer strategic sophistication from behavior. In
generic fully mixed games however, the levels “cycle”17, meaning that no action is
“more sophisticated” than another. For this reason, there have been no attempts (to
our knowledge) to behaviorally identify sophistication in fully mixed games.
Since we have enriched standard actions data with stated beliefs in an array of games
with systematically varied payoffs, our data is ideal for understanding sophistication
in such games. In addition, we have included the dominance solvable games D1 and
D2, which we use to measure sophistication at the subject level. In game Di, player
i has a strictly dominant action. Of player j’s two actions, one is the unique best
response to i’s dominant action and the other is the unique best response to a uniform
(or sufficiently uniform) distribution. In other words, this first action of player j is that
17For example, for games of the form of Figure 3.1, the best response to L is U to which the best
response is R to which the best response is D to which the best response is L. If level 0 is taken
to uniformly mix, and assuming L is the unique best response to q = 12 and R is the unique best
response to p = 12 (as is the case for almost all games in this family), then the actions taken by levels
k = 0, 1, 2, 3, ... for players 1 and 2 are p = 12 , U,D,D,U, U,D,D, ... and q =
1
2 , R,R,L, L,R,R, ...,
respectively.
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taken by a player with Level 2 or higher whereas the second action would be taken
by Level 1. We thus use the belief that a player i-subject places on the first of these
j-actions as a measure of strategic sophistication.
3.7.1 Sophistication and Player Role
How does the player role itself affect strategic sophistication? To answer this question,
we compare our simple sophistication measure across player 1- and player 2-subjects.
Importantly, since D1 and D2 are exactly the same (up to permutation of rows and
columns), this measure is exactly the same for both players, and hence and any differ-
ence across players in sophistication must be due to experience in different roles of the
X-games.
Figure 3.7 plots histograms of subjects’ average sophistication (averaged across three
instances of Di) by player-type, with player 1 on the left and player 2 on the right.
Comparing average levels of sophistication (solid lines) across players reveals that player
1’s average sophistication of 56% is much greater than player 2’s average of 33%. Inter-
estingly, both players best respond to their opponents’ dominant action at nearly the
same frequency, 80% for player 1 and 76% for player 2 (dashed lines).
Player 1 is much more sophisticated than player 2. One hypothesis is that something
about player 1’s role in the X-games is more difficult, and hence player 1 subjects
end up thinking harder on the X-games and this somehow “spills over” to the Di
games. However, despite having slightly slower response times on the X-games, player
1-subjects do not spend longer on Di than player 2-subjects. Furthermore, we define
player i’s “attention” as his average belief that j takes his dominant action in Dj.18
As shown in Figure 3.8, player 1 and player 2-subjects have similar distributions of
attention and take dominated actions in Di at very nearly the same rate (dashed lines).




We measure player i’s sophistication as his belief that player j plays the best response to i’s
dominant action instead of a best response to a uniform distribution in game Di. This figure plots a
histogram of subjects’ average sophistication. The left panel is for player 1, and the right panel is for
player 2. The solid line marks i’s average sophistication, and the dashed line is the empirical
frequency with which j best responds to i’s dominant action.
Figure 3.8: Attention
We plot subject i’s belief that j takes j’s dominant action in Dj, a measure we call “attention”. The
left panel is for player 1, and the right panel is for player 2. The solid line marks i’s average
attention, and the dashed line is the empirical frequency with which j takes his dominant action.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Soph. Soph. Soph. Soph. Soph. Soph.
Player 1 22.465∗∗∗ 20.846∗∗∗ 21.418∗∗∗ 25.509∗∗∗ 23.492∗∗∗ 22.730∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Response time 0.582∗∗∗ 0.588∗∗∗ 0.655∗∗∗ 0.693∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Attention 0.290∗∗ 0.359∗∗
(0.047) (0.032)
Constant 33.887∗∗∗ 17.137∗∗ -8.144 33.150∗∗∗ 14.880∗∗ -17.036
(0.000) (0.011) (0.567) (0.000) (0.042) (0.298)
Observations 110 110 110 92 92 92
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table 3.14: Effect of player role on sophistication. Column 1 regresses sophistication on an
indicator for player 1. Column 2 controls for subject-average response time on the three rounds of
Di. Column 3 additionally controls for the attention measure. Columns 4-6 are the same, except after
dropping subjects who ever took a dominated action throughout the experiment.
Hence, the difference in sophistication does not seem to reflect simple differences in
effort. Indeed, Table 3.14 shows that the sophistication gap between players is robust
to controlling for response times and attention as well as dropping subjects who took
at least one dominated action in the experiment.
3.7.2 The Relationship Between Sophistication and Behavior
Does sophistication measured in dominance solvable games predict behavior in fully
mixed games? To answer this, we divide player 1-subjects into equal-sized “sophis-
ticated” and “un-sophisticated” groups based on the player 1-median of the sophisti-
cation measure, and similarly for player 2-subjects. Figure 3.9 replicates Figure 3.3,
but is broken down into sophisticated and un-sophisticated groups. We find that so-
phistication, measured in the dominance solvable Di-games, is strongly predictive of
behavior in the fully mixed X-games. This is particularly interesting as other studies
find no “persistence of strategic sophistication” across different types of games (see, for
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Figure 3.9: Sophistication and behavior
example, Georganas et al. (2015)).
For X > 20 (the case of X < 20 being symmetric), player 1-subjects believe player
2 will play R more often than L. Less sophisticated player 1’s tend to believe player
2’s behavior is relatively more uniform. Consistent with these beliefs, un-sophisticated
player 1’s tend to take U , whereas sophisticated player 1’s tend to take D. Player
2-subjects believe player 1 will play U more often than L. Less sophisticated player 2’s
tend to believe player 1 takes U relatively more often (naively responding to large X
perhaps), and accordingly play R relatively more often.
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Figure 3.10: Actions without belief elicitation
Interestingly, it is the un-sophisticated player 1-subjects and the sophisticated player
2-subjects who are most consistent with the joint QRE-NBE predictions.
3.8 The Effects of Belief Elicitation
We show that the actions data from Section A differs significantly from that of Section
BA. To this end, we run F -tests (clustering by subject) and reject the joint hypothesis
that the action frequencies from Section A equal the action frequencies from Section
B game-by-game for all six X-games (p-values of 0.00 and 0.02 for players 1 and 2,
respectively).
Our hypothesis is that this difference is caused by belief elicitation. However, the
two sections differ in their order, the fact that the games in BA are played against
previously recorded actions, and very slightly in their composition of games. To nail
down the cause, we run an additional treatment called A-A. This is identical to the
A-BA treatment except beliefs are not elicited (and instructions never mention belief
elicitation).
In Figure 3.10, we plot the action frequencies separately for the two stages of A-A.
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We find that the first-section action frequencies cannot be distinguished statistically
from the second-section action frequencies, with very similar averages quantitatively
(p-values of 0.94 and 0.22 for players 1 and 2, respectively). We conclude that belief
elicitation does effect actions. This finding adds to a literature with mixed results on
the issue, with some studies claiming no such effect. For discussions, see Schotter and
Trevino (2014), Aguirregabiria and Xie (2017), and Schlag et al. (2015).
Importantly, the “direction” of the change in actions data due to belief elicitation
is systematic. Hence, there is hope that, even though we cannot say that the stated
beliefs are necessarily a good approximation of the beliefs subjects held when playing
the games without elicitation, we may be able to de-bias the effects of elicitation to
infer those beliefs. What is more, based on the analysis of the Section 3.7, we can
say that the direction of the change in action frequencies is consistent with increasing
sophistication.
3.9 Conclusion
We run a laboratory experiment in which subjects play games and state their beliefs
over their opponents’ actions. By using a family of games that vary systematically in
payoffs, we observe the mapping from opponents’ actions to beliefs and the mapping
from expected payoffs (given beliefs) to actions. Our results have direct implications for
the validity of assumptions underlying broad families of stochastic equilibrium models.
In particular, we find systematic bias in beliefs and systematic failures of best response,
which we relate to features of the underlying game. By relating subject-level behaviors
to measures of sophistication, we find that the player role itself can have an important
effect on sophistication, and sophistication has a surprising effect on behavior in fully
mixed games. We provide evidence that belief elicitation effects actions in a direction
consistent with increasing sophistication.
100
Bibliography
Aguirregabiria, V. and E. Xie (2017): “Identifcation of Biased Beliefs in Games
of Incomplete Information Using Experimental Data,” Working Paper.
Akerlof, G. (1970): “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84, 488–500.
Alaoui, L. and A. Penta (2015): “Endogenous depth of reasoning,” Review of
Economic Studies.
Ali, S. N., J. Goeree, N. Kartik, and T. Palfrey (2008): “Information Aggre-
gation in Standing and Ad Hoc Committees,” American Economic Review: Papers
and Proceedings, 98, 181–186.
Austen-Smith, D. and J. S. Banks (1996): “Information Aggregation, Rationality,
and the Condorcet Jury Theorem,” American Political Science Review, 90, 34–45.
Battaglini, M., R. Morton, and T. Palfrey (2008a): “Efficiency, Equity, and
Timing in Voting Mechanisms,” American Political Science Review, 101, 409–23.
——— (2008b): “The Swing Voter’s Curse in the Laboratory,” Review of Economic
Studies, 77, 61–89.
Bernheim, D. (1984): “Rationalizable Strategic Behavior,” Econometrica.
Bhattacharya, S., J. Duffy, and S.-T. Kim (2014): “Compulsory versus volun-
tary voting: An experimental study,” Games and Economic Behaviour, 84, 111–131.
101
Capen, E., R. Clapp, and W. Campbell (1971): “Competitive Bidding in High-
Risk Situations,” Journal of Petroleum Technology, 23, 641–53.
Charness, G. and D. Levin (2009): “The Origin of the Winner’s Curse: A Labo-
ratory Study,” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 1, 207–236.
Chen, D., M. Schonger, and C. Wickens (2016): “oTree – An open-source plat-
form for laboratory, online, and field experiments’,” Journal of Behavioral and Ex-
perimental Finance, 9, 88–97.
Costa-Gomes, M. and G. Weizsacker (2008): “Stated Beliefs and Play in Normal-
Form Games,” The Review of Economic Studies.
Coughlan, P. (2000): “In Defense of Unanimous Jury Verdicts: Mistrials, Commu-
nication, and Strategic Voting,” American Political Science Review, 94, 375–93.
Esponda, I. and E. Vespa (2014): “Hypothetical Thinking and Information Extrac-
tion in the Laboratory,” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 6, 180–202.
——— (2019): “Hypothetical Thinking and Information Extraction in the Laboratory,”
Working Paper.
Eyster, E. and M. Rabin (2002): “Cursed Equilibrium,” Working Paper.
——— (2005): “Cursed Equilibrium,” Econometrica, 75, 1623–1672.
Feddersen, T. and W. Pesendorfer (1996): “The Swing Voter’s Curse,” The
American Economic Review, 86, 408–424.
——— (1998): “Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts
under Strategic Voting,” American Political Science Review, 92, 23–36.
Friedman, E. (2018): “Stochastic Equilibria: Noise in Actions or Beliefs?” Working
Paper.
102
Friedman, J. and C. Mezzetti (2005): “Random Belief Equilibrium in Normal
Form Games,” Games and Economic Behavior.
Georganas, S., P. Healy, and R. Weber (2015): “On the persistence of Strategic
Sophistication,” Journal of Economic Theory.
Goeree, J., C. Holt, and T. Palfrey (2003): “Risk Averse Behavior in General-
ized Matching Pennies Games,” Games and Economic Behavior.
——— (2005): “Regular quantal response equilibrium,” Experimental Economics.
Goeree, J. and L. Yariv (2011): “An Experimental Study of Collective Delibera-
tion,” Econometrica, 79, 893–921.
Greiner, B. (2004): “The online recruitment system ORSEE 2.0 - A guide for the
organization of experiments in economics,” University of Cologne Working Paper
Series in Economics, 10.
Großer, J. and M. Seebauer (2016): “The curse of uninformed voting: An ex-
perimental study,” Games and Economic Behaviour, 97, 205–226.
Guarnaschelli, S., R. D. McKelvey, and T. R. Palfrey (2000): “An Experi-
mental Study of Jury Decision Rules,” American Political Science Review, 94.
Harrison, G., J. Martinez-Correa, and J. T. Swarthout (2013): “Inducing
risk neutral preferences with binary lotteries: A reconsideration,” Journal of Eco-
nomic Behavior and Organization, 94, 145–159.
Huck, S. and G. Weizsacker (2002): “Do players correctly estimate what oth-
ers do?: Evidence of conservatism in beliefs,” Journal of Economic Behavior and
Organization.
Invernizzi, G. (2018): “Public Information: Relevance or Salience?” Working Paper.
103
Karni, E. (2009): “A Mechanism for Eliciting Probabilities,” Econometrica.
Kawamura, K. and V. Vlaseros (2017): “Expert information and majority deci-
sions,” Journal of Public Economics, 147, 77–88.
Koch, C. and S. Penczynski (2018): “The winner’s curse: Conditional reasoning
and belief formation,” Journal of Economic Theory, 174, 57–102.
McKelvey, R. and T. Palfrey (1995): “Quantal response equilibria for normal
form games,” Games and Economic Behavior.
McKelvey, R., T. Palfrey, and R. Weber (2000): “The effects of payoff magni-
tude and heterogeneity on behavior in 2x2 games with unique mixed strategy equi-
libria,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization.
Nagel, R. (1995): “Unraveling in guessing games: an experimental study,” American
Economic Review.
Nyarko, Y. and A. Schotter (2002): “An Experimental Study of Belief Learning
Using Elicited Beliefs,” Econometrica.
Ochs, J. (1995): “An experimental study of games with unique mixed strategy equi-
libria,” Games and Economic Behavior.
Palfrey, T. (2016): “Experiments in Political Economy,” in The Handbook of Exper-
imental Economics, Volume 2, ed. by J. Kagel and A. Roth, Princeton University
Press, chap. 6, 347–434.
Pearce, D. (1984): “Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfec-
tion,” Econometrica.
Rubinstein, A. and M. Osborne (2003): “Sampling Equilibrium, with an Appli-
cation to Strategic Voting,” Games and Economic Behavior.
104
Samuelson, W. and M. Bazerman (1985): “The Winner’s Curse in Bilateral Ne-
gotiations,” in Research in Experimental Economics, ed. by V. Smith, JAI Press,
105–37.
Schlag, K. H., J. Tremewan, and J. J. van der Weele (2015): “A penny for
your thoughts: a survey of methods for eliciting beliefs,” Experimental Economics,
18, 457–490.
Schotter, A. and I. Trevino (2014): “Belief Elicitation in the Laboratory,” Annual
Review of Economics, 6, 103–128.
Selten, R. and T. Chmura (2008): “Stationary concepts for experimental 2x2
games,” American Economic Review.
Weber, R. (2003): “’Learning’ with no feedback in a competitive guessing game,”
Games and Economic Behavior.
105
Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
106
A.1 Experimental Instructions
This is an experiment in decision making. All interaction will be completed on the
screen in front of you, and from this point on you may not talk to other participants
until the conclusion of the experiment. If you have any problems or questions during
the experiment, raise your hand and wait for the assistance of an experimenter. We
ask at this point that you make sure you have reviewed and signed both consent forms
on your desk.
Before we begin, the rules of the lab are that you not eat or drink while you are
in the lab, and you also must have your cellphones turned off. This lab has a ‘no-
deception’ policy, which says that neither I nor the experiment can lie to or deceive you
in any way - the game is exactly as I present it, with no hidden elements, and should
have no partial or unclear information.
The experiment will consist of six sections. Within each section, the procedure for
each of the 15 rounds will be identical, but there will be differences between each of
the sections. Before each section we will thus read instructions regarding the rules for
that section.
Your earnings will consist of a $5 fixed fee for taking part in the experiment, and
an additional payment determined by your actions in the game, by chance, and by the
actions of others. The details of this will be made explicit as we describe each game.
Section 1 [GMP w/ Majority Voting]
In Section 1, you will play 15 rounds of a group voting game. At the start of each
round, you will be randomly sorted into a group of five players. You will not know
which other participants are in your group.
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Jar Overhead
Next, one of two virtual jars will be randomly assigned to each group. The two possible
jars are shown on the overhead now. The ‘red jar’, shown on the left, contains 7 red
balls and 3 blue balls. The ‘blue jar’, shown on the right, contains 7 blue balls and 3
red balls. For each group, each jar is equally likely to be assigned to it. Each group’s
task is to determine the colour of its assigned jar.
To help you with this decision, you will be shown an image of your group’s jar with
the order of the balls randomized and all colours obscured. You will then select a ball
from the jar and observe its colour. The overhead shows an example of this process -
the blue jar is randomly assigned to the group, the order of its balls are randomized,
the colours of the balls are obscured, and the player has then selected a blue ball.
After you have selected a ball, you will then vote for either the red jar or the blue
jar. Your group’s decision will be made by simple majority - if three or more of the
five group members vote for the red jar, the group will select the red jar, otherwise the
group will select the blue jar. In each round, if your group makes the correct decision,
it will be added to your running total of correct group decisions, and you will receive
an additional 25 cents at the end of the experiment.
I will now walk you through the first practice round to teach you the experimental
interface. Throughout, certain actions may take you away from the relevant screen, so
please do not take any actions until I ask.
Main Screen
You should now see the first screen of the first round, both on the screen in front you
and the overhead. Again, please do not click on anything until asked. You will note
first that the round and section numbers are shown at the top of the screen, as well as a
record of the number of correct decisions your groups have made. At the bottom of the
108
screen you will see the section number, and the rules of the game - that is, the group
decision procedure on the left, which says that group decisions are made by majority,
and on the right a reminder that your group has five members, and that for each of the
two possible jars 7 of the 10 balls match the colour of the jar. All of this information
will be presented on every screen of every round of the first section. Note that the game
is identical in every round of this section, and thus this information does not change.
In the middle of the screen, you will see the assigned jar with its colours obscured.
To select a ball and reveal its colour, you simply click on it. You may do this now.
Once you have selected a ball, you will be asked to vote. To do this, click on the
button for the color you wish to vote for. Once you have selected a colour, a new button
of the same colour will appear. Clicking this button will finalize and cast your vote.
Prior to clicking this button, you can change your selection by clicking the ‘red’ and
‘blue’ buttons as many times as you wish, but once you have clicked the vote button,
your vote will be final. Please select a colour and cast your vote now.
Results screen
Once everyone has voted, you will be shown the colour of the jar, and told which colour
your group voted for. You will also see the number of votes your group cast for each
colour, as well as the colour of both your own vote and your selected ball. Finally, you
will see an updated count of your correct group decisions, both in the center of the
screen, and in the usual position at the top. When you are ready, click ’continue’ to
indicate that you are ready to move on to the next round.
You have now completed the first practice round for the first section. Every round
in the first section will follow the exact procedure as the game you have just played.
Are there any questions at this time about the game, the rules, the computer players,
or the interface? You will now play a second practice round, unguided. You may play
the second practice round now.
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Paid Section 1
You have now completed the practice rounds for this section, and we will proceed to
the paid rounds. This section will consist of 15 rounds, each of which follows exactly
the same procedure as the practice rounds you have just played. In each round you
will be randomly sorted into a group of five, and one of the two jars will be randomly
assigned to your group, always with each having equal likelihood of being assigned, so
that each round is completely independent from the others.
Are there any questions about the rules before we begin? You may begin the paid
rounds.
Section 2 [GMP w/ Red Unanimity]
You have now completed the first section of the experiment, and we proceed to the
second. In the second section of the experiment the game follows exactly the same
procedure as the first section, except the group decision process is changed. In this
section, the group only selects the red jar if all five group members vote for it, otherwise
the group selects the blue jar. This decision procedure will be known as red unanimity.
The game is otherwise unchanged. The screens you face will be identical, with the
exception that the information regarding the voting procedure on the bottom left of
each screen is updated to reflect the red unanimity rules.
This section will again consist of 15 rounds, each following these exact rules. In
each round you will be randomly sorted into a group of five, and one of the two jars
will be randomly assigned to your group, always with each having equal likelihood of
being assigned, so that each round is completely independent from the others.
Are there any questions about the rules before we begin? You may begin the second
section.
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Section 3 [Informative Computer Game]
You have completed the second section of the experiment, and we proceed to the third.
In this section the game follows the same procedure as the previous section except that
the group composition is now changed. Now, instead of playing in groups with other
participants, your group will consist of you and four computer players, for a total of
five players.
Computer players follow the same steps as human players, and act completely inde-
pendently of you and of each other. That is, each computer player will privately select
a ball from the chosen jar exactly as a human player would, and will then privately
vote for a colour. Each computer player will always vote for the colour matching the
ball that it selected - if a computer player selects a red ball from the jar, it will vote for
the red jar, and if it selects a blue ball from the jar, it will vote for the blue jar. Again,
computer players act completely independently - they each randomly select their own
ball, and do not share that information with each other, then each independently cast
their own vote. For example, if three computer players in your group select blue balls,
and one computer player selects a red ball, then three computer players will vote for the
blue jar, and one computer player will vote for the red jar, as shown on the overhead.
The game is otherwise the same as in the previous section, including that the group’s
decisions are made by red unanimity. The interface is identical, with the exception of
the information regarding computer players and their behaviour, which is added to the
bottom-right of the screen.
This section will again consist of 15 rounds, each following these exact rules. In each
round, one of the two jars will be randomly assigned to your group, always with each
having equal likelihood of being assigned, so that each round is completely independent
from the others.
Are there any questions about the rules before we begin? You may begin the third
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section.
Section 4 [Reverse Computer Game]
You have completed the third section of the experiment, and we proceed to the fourth.
In this section the game follows the same procedure as the previous section except that
now each computer player will vote for the jar that does not match its selected ball.
That is, a computer player that selects a red ball will vote for the blue jar, while a
computer player that selects a blue ball will vote for the red jar. For example, if three
computer players select red balls and one computer player selects a blue ball, now three
computer players will vote for the blue jar and one computer player will vote for the
red jar, as shown on the overhead.
The game is otherwise the same as in the previous section, including that the group’s
decisions are made by red unanimity. The interface is identical, with the exception of
the information regarding computer players and their behaviour, which is updated at
the bottom-right of the screen.
This section will again consist of 15 rounds, each following these exact rules. In each
round one of the two jars will be randomly assigned to your group, always with each
having equal likelihood of being assigned, so that each round is completely independent
from the others.
Are there any questions about the rules before we begin? You may begin the fourth
section.
Section 5 [Option Game]
You have completed the fourth section of the experiment, and we proceed to the fifth.
In this section the game will change in two ways. The first is that computer players
will revert to voting for the colour of their selected ball. That is, a computer player
112
that selects a blue ball will vote for the blue jar, while a computer player that selects
a red ball will vote for the red jar. This information is again shown on the overhead.
The second change is that at the beginning of each round you will be given two
options, labelled Option A and Option B. If you select Option A, you will then select
a ball from the jar as previously, but your vote will then be cast to automatically
match the colour of your selected ball. That is, if you select a blue ball then you
will automatically vote for the blue jar, while if you select a red ball then you will
automatically vote for the red jar.
If you select Option B, you will still click on a ball, but doing so will have not reveal
its colour - that is, all 10 balls will remain grey. You will then choose which colour you
wish to vote for, as in previous sections.
Again, under Option A, clicking a ball reveals its colour, and your vote is automat-
ically cast to match that colour. Under Option B, clicking a ball does not reveal its
colour, and you then select which colour you wish to vote for.
It is important to note that the option you choose has no impact on the computer
players. Regardless of which option you choose, each computer player selects a ball
from the jar, observes its colour, and then votes for that colour.
I will now walk you through the first of two practice rounds to teach you the exper-
imental interface. Throughout, certain actions may take you away from the relevant
screen, so please do not take any actions until I ask.
Option Screen
You should now see the first screen of the first practice round, in which you will select
between these two new options. In the center of the screen you will see the two options,
along with the rules for each option. For Option A, you can see that selecting a ball
reveals its colour, and your vote is automatically cast to match the colour of your
selected ball. For Option B, you can see that selecting a ball has no impact, and you
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select which colour you wish to vote for. Underneath, you can see information that
is the same for both options. Specifically, under both options, when each computer
player selects a ball, its colour is revealed, and the player then votes for the colour that
matches the selected ball. This information is also included on the bottom-right of the
screen, as in previous sections.
Are there any questions about these options, or the information shown on this
screen?
You may now select an option. To do so, just click on the button containing the
words ‘Option A’ or ‘Option B’.
Voting Screen
Once each player has selected an option, the interface is similar to previous sections.
Regardless of which option you selected, you will be asked to click on a ball. If you
selected Option A, this will reveal the colour of the ball and automatically cast your
vote to match that colour. If you selected Option B clicking the ball will have no
impact, and you will then be asked to select your vote. You may now select a ball and,
if necessary, vote.
Once all players have voted, you will be taken to the results screen, which is the
same as previous sections.
Are there any questions about the game, the new rules, or the interface? You may
click continue when you are ready and proceed to play the second practice round.
Paid Section 5
You have now completed the practice rounds for this section, and we will proceed to
the paid rounds.
This section will again consist of 15 rounds, each following these exact rules. In each
round one of the two jars will be randomly assigned to your group, always with each
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having equal likelihood of being assigned, so that each round is completely independent
from the others.
Are there any questions about the rules before we begin? You may begin the fifth
section.
Section 6 Instructions [Bidding Game]
You have now completed the fifth section, and we proceed to the sixth. In this section,
we move from the group voting game to an individual decision game. As in previous
sections, you will play 15 rounds of this game. You will also play two practice rounds,
so you can familiarize yourself with the rules and the interface.
In this game, you will earn points. At the end of the experiment, you will be paid 25c
for every 120 points you earn, in addition to your earnings from the previous sections.
In each round, you will see 100 cards on your screen, in a 5 x 20 array. Each of
these cards has a value between 20 points and 119 points inclusive, with each value in
this range assigned to exactly one card. The order of the cards is randomized, with the
values obscured.
In each round, you will be given an endowment of 120 points. You will then choose
a bid (a whole number between 0 and 120 inclusive) and will then select one of the
cards. The value of this card will then be revealed to you.
If your bid is greater than or equal to the selected card’s value, you receive 150
percent of this card’s value, minus your bid, in addition to your 120 point endowment.
If your bid is less than the card’s value, nothing happens, and you simply retain your
120 point endowment.
Suppose, for example, you bid 62:
• Suppose the value of your selected card is 56. Then its worth to you is 56 x 1.5
= 84 points. Since your bid was 62, you add 84 - 62 = 22 to your endowment,
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and thus earn 142 points overall.
• Suppose the value of your selected card is 30. Then its worth to you is 30 x 1.5
= 45 points. Since your bid was 62, you add 45 - 62 = -17 to your endowment,
and thus earn 103 points overall.
• Suppose the value of your selected card is 67. Since your bid was 62, no transaction
takes place and you add nothing to your endowment, and thus earn 120 points
overall.
You will play this game for 15 rounds, each time being asked to submit a bid and
select a card, and with the cards randomly rearranged in each round. A running total
of your accumulated points will be shown at the top right of the screen.
Are there any questions about this game before we begin the practice rounds?
I will now walk you through the first practice round to teach you the experimental
interface. Throughout, certain actions may take you away from the relevant screen, so
please do not take any actions until I ask.
Bid/Card Screen
You should now see the first screen of the first round, both on the screen in front you
and the overhead. Again, please do not click on anything until asked. Note that the
rules of the game, which are identical for each round, are available at the bottom of
the screen. At the top of the screen you will again see the section and round number,
and the total number of points you have accumulated in this section.
Above the cards in the centre of the screen you will see a box into which you will
type your bid. Your bid must be a whole number between 0 and 120 inclusive. Once
you have typed a bid, you may click on one of the cards to select it. Do this now.
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Results Screen Overhead
Once you have selected a card, its value will be revealed to you in black, with the values
of the other cards revealed in grey. Below the cards you will see your results - your bid,
the value of your selected card, and your overall earnings for the round. You will also
see an updated count of your total points earned in this section, which is also shown
at the top right of the screen.
Once you are ready to continue, please click continue. Once all have done so, you
can play the second practice round.
You have now completed the practice rounds of the sixth section. Are there any
questions about the rules or the interface before we begin the paid rounds? There are 15
paid rounds, each of which follows exactly the same procedure as the practice rounds
you have just played. In each round, the cards are randomly rearranged, so that each
round is independent of the others. You may play the 15 paid rounds now.
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A.2 Experimental Overheads
Figure A.1: Experimental Overheads - Slide 1
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Figure A.2: Experimental Overheads - Slides 2 and 3
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Figure A.3: Experimental Overheads - Slides 4 and 5
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Figure A.4: Experimental Overheads - Slides 6 and 7
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Figure A.5: Experimental Overheads - Slides 8 and 9
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Figure A.6: Experimental Overheads - Slides 10 and 11
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Figure A.7: Experimental Overheads - Slide 12 and 13
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Figure A.8: Experimental Overheads - Slides 14 and 15
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Figure A.9: Experimental Overheads - Slides 16 and 17
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Figure A.10: Experimental Overheads - Slides 18 and 19
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A.3 Experimental Interface




Figure A.12: Jury Voting Interface, Continued
(a) Results
(b) Option Screen (OCG Only)
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A.4 Permutation Tests
Consider the comparison of σˆ(s) across treatments A and B for some signal s ∈ {r, b}.
A standard difference in proportions test is invalidated by the fact that the samples are
non-independent in two ways: (a) the within-subject design means each subject appears
in both treatments, and (b) each subject plays multiple rounds and so accounts for
multiple observations within each treatment. To account for this, I create a distribution
for the statistic |σˆA(s) − σˆB(s)| under the null hypothesis that behaviour in the two
treatments is the same, σˆA(s) = σˆB(s).
To do this two new datasets, A′ and B′, are created by randomly determining
for each subject whether their data will be assigned to the matching dataset or the
mismatching dataset. That is, for each subject i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 220}, with probability 1
2
subject i’s observations from treatment A will be assigned to A′ and her observations
from treatment B will be assigned to B′, while with probability 1
2
her observations
from treatment A will be assigned to B′ and her observations from treatment B will
be assigned to A′. Whether a subject’s observations are assigned to the matching or
mismatching datasets is independent between subjects.
This resampling procedure is repeated 10,000 times, with the resampled test statistic
|σˆ′A(s) − σˆ′B(s)| recorded for each. This results in a distribution of the statistic that
is valid under the null hypothesis. The proportion of values in this distribution that
exceed the observed value |σˆA(s) − σˆB(s)| provides the p-value for the two-tailed test
of the alternate hypothesis that σˆA(s) 6= σˆB(s).
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B.1 Experimental Interface




B.2 Additional Auction Game Results
Bidding Behaviour
Figure B.2 shows all bids, and the standard deviation of those bids, for all subjects.
Subjects are ordered by median bid, increasing from left to right.
Figure B.2: All Bids by Subject
Short-term Bid Changes
The following recreates Charness and Levin’s (2009) analysis of round-to-round changes
in subjects’ bids. Table B.1 shows how often subjects increase, decrease, or maintain
their bids relative to the previous bid as a function of realized gains and losses of that
bid. The results are largely similar to Charness and Levin’s, including that subjects
who make losses tend to decrease or maintain their bids in the following round, those
who make gains are most likely to maintain their bids, and those who make neither
gains nor losses are more likely to increase or maintain their bids.
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Table B.1: Bid Changes by Previous Outcome
Increase Bid No Change Decrease Bid
Gain 180 (26.5%) 310 (45.7%) 188 (27.7%)
No Gain/Loss 637 (40.9%) 635 (40.8%) 286 (18.4%)
Loss 137 (16.2%) 292 (34.6%) 415 (49.2%)
Total 954 (31.0%) 1237 (40.2%) 889 (28.9%)
Table B.2 presents a linear regression of the change in a subject’s bid relative to the
previous bid upon lagged payoffs. It suggests that outcomes with no gains or losses -
which generally implies no transaction - lead to substantially increased bids in the next
round, while gains have a smaller positive effect, as does experience, which is discussed
further in the main text.






Lag Net Payoff 0.131
0.000






Notes: Standard errors are clustered by subject and p-values are presented below the estimates.
B.3 Permutation Tests
Here I describe the permutation tests used to test the significance of the changes in
AG behaviour over time presented in Table 2.2. The null hypothesis of each test is
that round numbers are not predictive of behaviour, an implication of behaviour not
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changing over time. Let Rp be a random permutation of the set of round numbers
R = [1, ..., 15]. I perform 10,000 such permutations, in each case relabelling the data
using Rp. That is, if the first element of Rp is 5, all data from the first round is relabelled
as coming from round 5. I then calculate the absolute value of the applicable statistic
for each column of Table 2.2 - that is, the absolute change in behaviour between the first
and last seven relabelled rounds. This creates a distribution for each statistic under the
null hypothesis. I then compare the absolute value of the observed statistic for each
column to the distribution, and report the percentile as the p−value. This constitutes
a two-tailed test of the null hypothesis against the alternative that experience matters.
B.4 Comparative Results - OCG and RCG
Table B.3 extends Table 2.6 to OCG and RCG, presenting linear regressions of a bid’s
expected payoff (Columns (a) and (b)) and logistic regressions of the probability that
a bid is an overbid (Columns (c) and (d)) upon the subject’s behaviour through each
of RCG and OCG.
The results generally follow those presented in the main text. For RCG, coefficients
on jury voting strategies are insignificant, showing no evidence of a relationship between
behaviour here and in AG. For OCG, on the other hand, a higher σˆB results in a lower
expected payoff in AG. Recall that σˆB measures the frequency with which a subject
selects Choice and then votes for the blue jar - behaviour which results in the lowest
expected payoff, and which we would not expect of either those capable of pivotal
reasoning (who we expect to select Choice and vote red) nor those who are not (who
we expect to select Information and thus vote informatively). Thus this is also in
keeping with the results of the main text, in that those who deviate from expected
behaviour in irrational ways in the jury voting games do worse in AG. The behaviour
that differentiates the sophisticated from the naive - selecting Choice and voting red,
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rather than selecting Information - appears to have no relationship with performance
in AG, with the coefficients on σˆR insignificant.
Table B.3: Regressions of AG Behaviour on Jury Voting Behaviour.
Variable Exp Payoff Overbid
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Jury RCG OCG RCG OCG
Constant -2.495 -2.502 0.515 0.330
0.000 0.000 0.016 0.138
Round -0.040 -0.040 -0.019 -0.019









AG First -0.008 0.156 0.281 0.256
0.986 0.713 0.136 0.172
Obs 3,300 3,300 3,300 3,300








This is an experiment in decision making, and you will be paid for your participation
in cash. Different subjects may earn different amounts of money. What you earn
depends partly on your decisions, partly on the decisions of others, and partly on luck.
In addition to these earnings, each of you will receive $10 just for participating in and
completing the experiment.
It is the policy of this lab that we are strictly forbidden from deceiving you, so you
can trust the experiment will proceed exactly as we describe, including the procedures
for payment.
The entire experiment will take place through your computers. It is important
that you do not talk or in any way try to communicate with other subjects during the
experiment.
Please turn off your cellphones now.
On the screen in front of you, you should see text asking you to wait for instructions,
followed by a text box with a button that says “ID”. Your computer ID is the number
at the top of your desk, which is between 1 and 24. In order to begin the experiment,
you must enter your computer ID into the box and press ‘ID’. Please do that now.
You should all now see a screen that says “please wait for instructions before con-
tinuing”. Is there anyone that does not see this screen? This screen will appear at
various points throughout the experiment. It is important that whenever you see this
screen, you do not click ‘continue’ until told to do so.
The experiment has two sections . We will start with a brief instruction period for
Section 1, in which you will be familiarized with the types of rounds you will encounter.
Additional instructions will be given for Section 2 after Section 1 is complete.
If you have any questions during the instruction period, raise your hand and your
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question will be answered so everyone can hear. If any difficulties arise after the exper-
iment has begun, raise your hand, and an experimenter will come and assist you.
At the beginning of the experiment, each subject will be assigned the color RED or
the color BLUE. There will be an equal number of RED and BLUE subjects. If you are
assigned RED, you will be RED for the entire experiment. If you are assigned BLUE,
you will be BLUE for the entire experiment.
Section 1 consists of several rounds . I will now describe what occurs in each round.
First, you will be randomly paired with a subject of the opposite color. Thus, if you
are a BLUE subject, you will be paired with a RED subject. If you are a RED subject,
you will be paired with a BLUE subject. You will not not know who you are paired
with, nor will the other subject know who you are. Each pairing lasts only one round.
At the start of the next round, you will be randomly re-paired.
[SLIDE 1]
In each round, you will see a matrix similar to the one currently shown on the
overhead, though the numbers will change every round. In every round, you and the
subject you are paired with will both see the same matrix , but remember that one of
you is BLUE and one of you is RED.
Both subjects in the pair will simultaneously be asked to make a choice. BLUE will
choose one of the two rows in the matrix, either ‘Up’ or ‘Down’, which we write as ‘U’
or ‘D’. RED will choose one of the two columns, either ‘Left’ or ‘Right’, which we write
as ‘L’ or ‘R’. We refer to these choices as “actions”. Notice that each pair of actions
corresponds to one of the 4 cells of the matrix. For instance, if BLUE chooses ‘U’ and
RED chooses ‘L’, this corresponds to the top-left cell, and similarly for the others.
Thus, depending on both players’ actions , there are 4 possible outcomes:
• If BLUE chooses ‘U’ and RED chooses ‘L’, BLUE receives a payoff of 10, since
that is the blue number in the UP–LEFT cell, and RED receives 20, since that
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is the RED number.
• If BLUE chooses ‘D’ and RED chooses ‘R’, BLUE receives a payoff of 11 and
RED receives 75.
• And the other two cells UP–RIGHT and DOWN–LEFT are similar.
We reiterate: each number in the matrix is a payoff that might be received by one of
the players, depending on both players’ actions. Are there any questions?
In this section, you will play for 20 rounds and 1 of your rounds will be chosen
for your payment. This 1 round will be selected randomly for each subject, and the
payment will depend on the actions taken in that round by you and the subject you
were paired with. In the selected round, your payoff in the chosen cell denotes the
probability with which you will receive $10. For example, if you receive a payoff of 60,
then for that round you would receive $10 with 60% probability and $0 otherwise.
Since every round has an equal chance of being selected for payment, and you do
not know which will be selected, it is in your best interest that you think carefully about
all of your choices .
During the experiment, no feedback will be provided about the other player’s chosen
action. Only at the end of the experiment will you get to see the round that was chosen
for your payment and the actions taken by you and the player you were paired with in
that round.
Before we begin the first section, you will answer 4 training questions to ensure you
understand this payoff structure. In each of these 4 questions, you will be shown a
matrix and told the actions chosen by both players. You will then be asked with what
probability a particular player earns $10 if this round were to be selected for payment.
That is, you are being asked for their payoff in the appropriate cell. To answer, simply
type the probability as a whole number into the box provided and click ‘continue’. The
page will only allow you to ‘continue’ when your answer is correct, at which point you
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may proceed to the next question. Please click ‘continue’ and answer the 4 training
questions now.
[SLIDE 2]
Now that you’ve completed the training questions and understand the payoff ma-
trices, we will proceed to Section 1. In each round of this section you will be randomly
paired with another subject. If you are BLUE, you will be paired with a RED subject,
and if you are RED, you will be paired with a BLUE subject. Recall that, at the start
of each round, you will be randomly re-paired.
In each round, for each pair, the RED player’s task will be to select a column of
the matrix, and the BLUE player’s task will be to select a row of the matrix, and these
actions determine both players’ payoffs for the round.
[SLIDE 3]
You should now see an example round on the overhead. This shows the screen for
a BLUE player, who is asked to choose between ‘U’ and ‘D’. Notice however that the
text instructing you to make a choice is faded. This is because you must wait for 10
seconds before you are allowed to make a decision. Once 10 seconds has passed, the
text will darken, indicating that you can now make a selection. The number of seconds
remaining until you are able to choose is shown in the bottom right corner. Now the
overhead shows what the screen will look like after the 10 seconds have passed.
[SLIDE 4]
The 10 seconds is a minimum time limit. There is no maximum time limit on your
choices, and you should feel free to take as much time as you need, even after the 10
seconds has passed. In order to make your selection, simply click on the row or column
of your choice. Once you have done so, your choice will be highlighted, and a ‘submit’
button will appear, as we now show on the overhead.
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[SLIDE 5]
You may change your answer as many times as you like before submitting. If you
would like to undo your choice, simply click again on the highlighted row or column.
Once you are satisfied with your choice, click ‘submit’ to move on to the next round.
Before beginning the paid rounds of Section 1, we will play 4 practice rounds to
familiarize you with the interface. These rounds will not be selected for payment. Are
there any questions about the game, the rules, or the interface before we begin the
practice rounds?
Please click ‘continue’ and begin the practice rounds now. You will notice that
you have been assigned either RED or BLUE. This will be your color throughout the
experiment. Please continue until you have completed the 4 practice rounds.
You have now completed the practice rounds, and we will proceed to the paid rounds
of Section 1. Section 1 consists of 20 rounds, exactly like those you have just played.
Recall that, in each round, you will be randomly paired with another subject and that
one round will be randomly selected for payment. Are there any questions about the
game, the rules, or the interface before we begin?
[SLIDE 6]
Please click ‘continue’ and play Section 1 now. The rules we discussed for Section
1 will be shown on the overhead as a reminder throughout.
[SLIDE 7]
We will now have a brief instruction period for Section 2, in which you will be
familiarized with the types of rounds you will encounter.
If you have any questions during the instruction period, raise your hand and your
question will be answered so everyone can hear. If any difficulties arise once play has
begun, raise your hand, and an experimenter will come and assist you.
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In this section, each round will be similar to those from Section 1. You will see
some of the same matrices and your assignment of RED or BLUE will be the same as
before.
Now, however, after being shown a matrix, your task will be to give your belief or
best guess about the probability that a randomly selected subject chose a particular
action when playing the same matrix in Section 1. That is, you will be shown a matrix,
and the computer will randomly select a round from Section 1 in which the same matrix
was played. Then,
• If you are RED, you will be asked for the probability that a randomly selected
BLUE player chose ‘U’ in that round in Section 1.
• If you are BLUE, you will be asked for the probability that a randomly selected
RED player chose ‘L’ in that round in Section 1.
As before, you will be paid for your responses. We will now describe this payment
mechanism.
[SLIDE 8]
Consider first the matrix that is shown on the overhead. Please imagine that the
computer has randomly selected a round from Section 1 in which this matrix was played.
We wish to know your belief about the probability that a randomly selected RED player
chose ’L’ in that round. Please, take some time now to think carefully about what you
believe this probability to be.
[SLIDE 9]
Consider the question that is now shown on the overhead, which asks which of the
following you would prefer:
• Under Option A, you receive $5 if a randomly selected RED player chose ’L’ in
that round, and $0 otherwise.
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• Under Option B, you receive $5 with probability 75%, and $0 otherwise.
Please think carefully about which of these two options you would prefer.
Presumably, if you believe the probability that a randomly selected RED player
chose ’L’ is greater than 75%, then you would prefer Option A, which you believe gives
you the highest probability of a $5 prize. For example, if you believe this probability
is 89%, you would choose Option A since 89 is greater than 75.
If, on the other hand, you believe the probability that a randomly selected RED
player chose ’L’ is less than 75%, then you would prefer Option B, which you believe
gives you the highest probability of a $5 prize. For example, if you believe this proba-
bility is 22%, you would choose Option B since 22 is less than 75.
In this way, your answer to this question will tell us whether you believe this prob-
ability is greater than or less than 75%.
[SLIDE 10]
Now imagine we asked you 101 of these questions, with the probability in Option
B ranging from 0% to 100%. Presumably you would answer each of these questions
as described previously. That is, for questions for which the probability in Option
B is below your belief, you would choose Option A, and for questions for which the
probability in Option B is above your belief, you would choose Option B. Imagine, for
example, you believe that there is a 64% probability that a randomly selected RED
player chose ’L’ in the selected round. Then, you would select Option A for all questions
before #64, and Option B for all questions after #64. For Question #64, you could
make either selection.
[SLIDE 11]
In this case, your selections would be as shown on the overhead, with the chosen
options in black and the unchosen options in gray. From these answers, we could
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determine that you believe the probability that a randomly selected RED player chose
’L’ is 64%.
In each round of this section, you will be faced with a table of 101 questions as
shown on the overhead. To save time, instead of having you answer each question
individually, we will simply ask you to type in your belief, and the answers to these
101 questions will be automatically filled out as above. That is, for rows of the table
in which the probability in Option B is below your stated belief you will automatically
select Option A, and for rows of the table in which the probability in Option B is at or
above your stated belief you will automatically select Option B.
If this round is chosen for payment, one of the 101 rows of the table will be randomly
selected and you will be paid according to your chosen option in that row. If you chose
Option A in that row, a subject of the relevant color will be randomly chosen, and you
will receive $5 if they played the relevant action in the selected round of Section 1. If
you chose Option B in that row, you will receive $5 with the probability given in that
option.
It is thus in your best interest, given your belief, to state your belief accurately .
Otherwise, if you type something other than your belief, there will be rows of the table
for which you will not be selecting the option that you believe gives you the highest
probability of receiving a $5 prize.
In this section you will play 40 rounds, giving 40 such beliefs. At the end of the
section, 2 rounds will be randomly chosen for payment. For each of these rounds, one
of the 101 rows of the table will be randomly selected and you will be paid according
to your chosen option in that row.
Are there any questions about this?
In addition to stating a belief, in each round you will also be asked to choose an
action, as you did in Section 1. Now, however, the other action will not be determined
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by another subject acting simultaneously. Instead, recall that the computer has ran-
domly selected a round from Section 1 featuring the matrix shown on your screen. The
computer will also randomly select a player of the other color and record the action
they took in that round. This is the action that you will be paired with. That is:
• If you are RED, the BLUE action will be that which a randomly selected BLUE
player chose in the selected round of Section 1.
• If you are BLUE, the RED action will be that which a randomly selected RED
player chose in the selected round of Section 1.
Again, the randomly selected round from Section 1 will feature the same matrix shown
on your screen, so your payoff is determined as if you were paired with a randomly
selected player from Section 1, rather than being paired with a player who chooses an
action simultaneously.
As in Section 1, your payoff from taking an action gives the probability of earning
$10 if the round is chosen for payment.
At the end of the section, 2 rounds will be randomly chosen for payments based
on your actions. This is in addition to the 2 rounds randomly chosen for payments
based on your beliefs. Moreover, the randomization algorithm that selects these rounds
will ensure that all 4 rounds feature different matrices and that these matrices will be
different from that selected for payment in Section 1. In particular, this means that if a
round is selected for an action-payment, it cannot also be selected for a belief-payment
and vice versa.
As before, since you do not know which round will be selected for payment, nor
which type of payment it will be selected for, these payment procedures ensure that,
in each round, it is in your best interest to both state your belief accurately and choose
the action that you think is best.
[SLIDE 12]
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You should now see an example round on the overhead. This shows the screen for a
BLUE player. As in Section 1, you will see the matrix in the middle of the screen. At
the top of the screen, you are told that the computer has randomly selected a round of
Section 1 in which this matrix was played.
Below this, the instructions are shown, and are again faded for 10 seconds. Once
10 seconds has passed, the text asking you for your belief will darken as now shown on
the overhead.
[SLIDE 13]
You will not be able to select an action until after you have entered your belief.
Once you have entered your belief, the resulting probabilities will appear below or
beside the matrix and the text asking you to select your action will darken, as now
shown on the overhead.
[SLIDE 14]
Your belief must be a whole number between 0 and 100 inclusive. Once you enter
your belief, we will automatically ’fill out’ the questions in the 101 rows based on your
belief as previously described. If you wish, at any time you may scroll down to observe
the 101 rows.
As in Section 1, once you have selected an action, it will be highlighted on the
matrix, as now shown on the overhead.
[SLIDE 15]
At this point, you may freely modify both your belief and action as many times
as you wish before pressing ‘submit’. Remember that there is no upper time limit on
your choices, and you should feel free to take as much time as you need, even after the
minimum 10 seconds has passed.
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Before beginning the paid rounds of Section 2, we will play 3 practice rounds to
familiarize you with the interface. These rounds feature the same matrices as the
practice rounds from Section 1, and will not be selected for payment. Are there any
questions about the game, the rules, or the interface before we begin the practice
rounds?
Please click ‘continue’ to be taken to the first practice round now. Recall that your
belief must be a whole number between 0 and 100 inclusive, and at any time you may
scroll down to see the table of 101 questions. Please continue until you have completed
the 3 practice rounds.
You’ve now completed the practice rounds, and we will proceed to the paid rounds
of Section 2.
[SLIDE 16]
Recall that Section 2 consists of 40 rounds, exactly like those you have just played.
4 rounds will be randomly selected for payment–2 rounds for beliefs and 2 rounds for
your actions. Again, these 4 rounds will feature different matrices to each other and to
the matrix selected for payment in Section 1. The payment procedures ensure that it
is always in your best interest to both state your belief accurately and choose the action
that you think is best . Unlike Section 1, Section 2 will be played at your own pace
without waiting for other subjects between rounds. Once you have completed Section
2, please remain seated quietly until all subjects have finished.
Are there any questions about the game, the rules, or the interface? If you have any
questions during the remainder of the experiment, raise your hand, and an experimenter
will come and assist you. You may click ’continue’ and play Section 2 now. The rules
we discussed for Section 2 will be shown on the overhead as a reminder throughout.
You have now completed the experiment. All that remains is to organize payments.
To do this, you will be shown a page with all of your randomly selected rounds and
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your earnings in each. This page will also show you how to fill out the payment receipt
at your desks. Before reaching this page, you will see an explanation page describing
how the results are determined and how to read them. You may click ‘continue’ now
and read through the explanation page. Then continue to the payments page, where






3 / 16 4 / 16




There are 20 rounds.
Subject pairs are randomly chosen each round.
In each round, you choose a row or column.
1 round will be randomly selected for payment.
For the selected round, your payoff from the matrix
gives your probability of winning $10.
6 / 16
Section 2
7 / 16 8 / 16
Figure C.2: Experimental Overheads - Slides 5 to 8
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Would you rather have:
Option A: Option B:
$5 if the red player chose L or $5 with probability 75%
9 / 16
Would you rather have:
Option A: Option B:
Q.0 $5 if the red player chose L or $5 with probability 0%
Q.1 $5 if the red player chose L or $5 with probability 1%
Q.2 $5 if the red player chose L or $5 with probability 2%
Q.3 $5 if the red player chose L or $5 with probability 3%
...
...
Q.97 $5 if the red player chose L or $5 with probability 97%
Q.98 $5 if the red player chose L or $5 with probability 98%
Q.99 $5 if the red player chose L or $5 with probability 99%
Q.100 $5 if the red player chose L or $5 with probability 100%
10 / 16
Would you rather have:
Option A: Option B:
Q.0 $5 if the red player chose L or $5 with probability 0%
Q.1 $5 if the red player chose L or $5 with probability 1%
Q.2 $5 if the red player chose L or $5 with probability 2%
Q.3 $5 if the red player chose L or $5 with probability 3%
...
...
Q.62 $5 if the red player chose L or $5 with probability 62%
Q.63 $5 if the red player chose L or $5 with probability 63%
Q.64 $5 if the red player chose L or $5 with probability 64%
Q.65 $5 if the red player chose L or $5 with probability 65%
...
...
Q.97 $5 if the red player chose L or $5 with probability 97%
Q.98 $5 if the red player chose L or $5 with probability 98%
Q.99 $5 if the red player chose L or $5 with probability 99%
Q.100 $5 if the red player chose L or $5 with probability 100%
11 / 16 12 / 16
Figure C.3: Experimental Overheads - Slides 9 to 12
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13 / 16 14 / 16
15 / 16
Section 2
There are 40 rounds.
In each round, the computer will randomly select a round of Section 1
with the same matrix as shown on your screen:
State your belief about the probability of a randomly selected
player’s action in that round.
Take an action–this will be paired against the action of a
randomly selected player in that round.
4 rounds will be randomly selected for payment:
2 rounds for beliefs
2 rounds for actions
16 / 16
Figure C.4: Experimental Overheads - Slides 13 to 16
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C.3 Proofs
Lemma 1. In game X:
(i) pNBE, pQRE ∈ (12 , 1) for qNE < 12 ; pNBE, pQRE ∈ (0, 12) for qNE > 12 .
(ii) qNBE, qQRE ∈ (qNE, 12) for qNE < 12 ; qNBE, qQRE ∈ (12 , qNE) for qNE > 12 .
(iii) pNBE, pQRE are strictly decreasing in qNE ∈ (0, 1).
(iv) qNBE, qQRE are strictly increasing in qNE ∈ (0, 1).



























if q < (=)qNE
p > (=)1
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if p > (=)1
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.
This shows (i) and (ii). Suppose qNE increases. From (ΨU ,ΨL), as qNE increases, it
must be that either p decreases and q increases, p increases and q decreases, or that
both p and q remain constant. The latter two cases are impossible since ΨU implies
that as qNE increases, p decreases if q is constant or decreases. Thus, as qNE increases,
p must strictly increase and q must strictly decrease. From (QU , QL), as qNE increases,
or equivalently, as X decreases, it must be that either p decreases and q increases, p
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increases and q decreases, or that both p and q remain constant. The latter two cases
are impossible since QU implies that as X decreases, p decreases if q is constant or
decreases. Thus, as qNE increases, p must strictly increase and q must strictly decrease.
This shows (iii) and (iv).
Lemma 2. In game X:




(ii) If QRE is translation invariant and label invariant, qQRE and pQRE are not




Proof. Fix game X with qNE =
20
X+20
. If {p, q} is an NBE, it solves (C.1). If F 1 and
F 2 are label invariant (see footnote 10), then F 1(qNE|q) = 1− F 1(1− qNE|1− q) and
F 2(1
2
|p) = 1 − F 1(1
2
|1 − p), and therefore {1 − p, 1 − q} is an NBE for game X with
q
′
NE = 1 − qNE. This shows (i). Fix game X with qNE = 20X+20 . If Q = (QU , QL)
is translation invariant, then quantal response depends only on the expected payoff
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Figure C.5: Screenshots from Section A
This figure shows an example round from the perspective of a player 1-subject (blue). At the start of
the round, the subject sees the payoff matrix (left screen), and a 10 second timer counting down to 0
(not shown here) is seen at the bottom right corner of the screen. After 10 seconds pass, the text
“Please click to select between U and D:” darkens (middle screen) indicating that the subject may
take an action. To select an action, the subject clicks on a row of the matrix. The row becomes
highlighted and a ’Submit’ button appears (right screen). At this point, the subject may freely
modify his answer before submitting. The subject may undo his action choice by clicking again on
the highlighted row.
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Figure C.6: Screenshots from Section BA
This figure shows an example round from the perspective of a player 1-subject (blue). At the start of
the round, the subject sees the payoff matrix (top-left screen) and is told “The computer has
randomly selected a round of Section 1 in which the below matrix was played.” After 10 seconds
pass, the text “What do you believe is the probability that a randomly selected red player chose L in
that round?” darkens (top-right screen) indicating that the subject may state a belief. The subject
enters a belief as a whole number between 0 and 100. Once the belief is entered, the corresponding
probabilities appear below the matrix and the text “The computer has randomly selected a red
player and recorded their action from that round. Please click to select between U and D:” darkens
(bottom-left screen) indicating that the subject may take an action. Only after stating a belief may
the subject select an action, but after the belief is stated, the subject may freely modify both his
belief and action before submitting. After a belief is entered and an action is selected, the ’Submit’
button appears (bottom-right screen).
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Figure C.7: Screenshots from A-A treatment
The first section of the A-A session is identical to that of the A-BA session. The second section of
the A-A session is the same as that of the A-BA session, except beliefs are not elicited.
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C.5 Mean Bias
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
X80 X40 X10 X5 X2 X1
beliefs - actions 26.280∗∗∗ 27.996∗∗∗ -16.473∗∗∗ -18.563∗∗∗ -25.750∗∗∗ -18.618∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001)
Observations 410 410 410 410 410 410
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table C.1: Player 2’s beliefs versus player 1’s actions
We report t-tests of the differences between the mean belief and the action frequency for each game.
Standard errors are clustered by subject.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
X80 X40 X10 X5 X2 X1
beliefs - actions 5.518 10.249∗∗ -7.312 -16.130∗∗∗ -10.971∗∗ -10.201∗
(0.306) (0.040) (0.193) (0.001) (0.045) (0.064)
Observations 404 404 404 404 404 404
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table C.2: Player 1’s beliefs versus player 2’s actions
We report t-tests of the differences between the mean belief and the action frequency for each game.
Standard errors are clustered by subject.
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C.5.1 Individual Subjects’ Data
qNE

























































































Figure C.8: Individual Subjects: Player 2’s Beliefs and Actions.
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Figure C.9: Individual Subjects: Player 1’s Beliefs and Actions.
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